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STRENGTHEN SECTION 702: A CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE TOOL VITAL 
TO THE PROTECTION OF OUR COUNTRY 
 
DEBORAH SAMUEL SILLS* 
 
The rising globalization of terrorist organizations and their ever more 
sophisticated abilities to reach people throughout the world has deepened the 
threat of terrorist activities both in the United States and abroad.  Recent 
events show that terrorist groups overseas have influenced homegrown 
terrorist acts in the United States.1  Many of these same overseas terrorist 
                                                
* Intelligence Community Fellow at Georgetown University Law Center, attorney with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and former Counsel to the President’s Intelligence Oversight 
Board. The views expressed in this article are my personal views and do not necessarily 
represent the views of any person or entity, including the United States Government. Nothing 
in the contents of this article should be construed as implying United States Government 
authentication of information. I especially would like to thank Professor David Koplow for his 
insightful guidance and encouragement throughout the drafting process. I would also like to 
thank Professor Laura Donohue, Judge James Baker, Professor James Zirkle, Professor 
William Buzbee, Tina Zimmerman, Robert Litt, my colleagues, particularly Karen Davis Miller, 
my husband, Jonathan Sills, and the members of the Georgetown Law Summer Workshop 
Group for their valuable and helpful comments. I am grateful to Professor Donohue and 
Susan Gibson for creating the fellowship program between Georgetown University Law Center 
and the United States Intelligence Community. I appreciate the dedication of the members of 
the editorial staff of the National Security Law Brief, American University Washington College 
of Law, particularly Ayat Mujais, for their meticulous review of this article. 
1 Sarah Frostenson, Most Terrorist Attacks in the US are Committed by Americans – Not Foreigners, 
VOX (Sept. 9, 2016) (“Homegrown terrorism commonly refers to terrorist acts committed by a 
government's own citizens.”). See Marc Santora, William K. Rashbaum, Al Baker and Adam 
Goldman, Ahmad Khan Rahami Is Arrested in Manhattan and New Jersey Bombings, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/nyregion/nyc-nj-explosions-
ahmad-khan-rahami.html; (reporting that on September 17, 2016, Ahmad Khan Rahami set off 
two bombs in New York City and Seaside Park, New Jersey, injuring 29 people); see also Marc 
Santora and Adam Goldman, Ahmad Khan Rahami Was Inspired by Bin Laden, Charges Say, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/nyregion/ahmad-khan-
rahami-suspect.html (reporting that, according to a criminal complaint, Rahami was inspired by 
international terrorists and was charged with several criminal offenses including use of 
weapons of mass destruction and bombing a place of public use); see also Mitch Smith, F.B.I. 
Treats Minnesota Mall Stabbing Attack as “Potential Act of Terrorism,” NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/us/police-shoot-attacker-in-minnesota-mall-
after-8-are-stabbed.html (noting that on September 17, 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a 
stabbing attack at a Minnesota shopping mall, in which nine people were injured); see also Asher 
Klein and Cathy Rainone, Who is Omar Mateen, Gunman in America’s Deadliest Mass Shooting? 
NBC4 NEW YORK (June 12, 2016), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Who-Omar-
Mateen-Suspected-Florida-Nightclub-Gunman-382619981.html (describing that Omar Mateen, 
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organizations are recruiting thousands of new members from Western 
countries, including hundreds from the United States.2  In light of these 
growing threats, the United States must ensure that our country has the 
necessary legal authorities to anticipate and counter them.  One such vehicle 
for providing the United States with these critical legal tools is through 
strengthening Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
Amendments Act (FAA).  
Information collected pursuant to the FAA Section 702 provides foreign 
intelligence information that is critical to the protection of the United States 
against terrorist threats.3  Members of the Intelligence Community believe 
                                                
a 29-year-old New York-born American citizen and Florida resident, killed 49 people in an 
Orlando nightclub and wounded 53 others. During the attacks, Mateen pledged allegiance to 
ISIS); see also Faith Karimi, Jason Hanna and Yousuf Basil, San Bernardino Shooters “Supporters” of 
ISIS, Terror Group Says, CNN (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-
bernardino-shooting/ (stating that on December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook, an American 
citizen born in the United States, and his wife Tashfeen Malik, killed 14 people and wounded 
21 in a shooting at a holiday party in San Bernardino, California. Malik posted a pledge of 
allegiance to an ISIS leader to Facebook).  
2 See, e.g., Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between National Security, Privacy 
and Civil Liberties, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Oversight, 114th Cong. 5 (2016) 
(statement of Matthew G. Olsen, Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Goitein_Written_Testimony_SJC
.pdf [hereinafter Stmt. of Olsen] (“More than 6,000 Europeans – including many French, 
German, British, and Belgian nationals – have travelled to Syria to join the fight. This is part of 
the total of approximately 40,000 foreign fighters in the region. Among the Europeans who 
have left for Syria, several hundred fighters have returned to their home countries, typically 
battle-hardened, trained, and further radicalized. The number of Americans who have travelled 
to Syria or Iraq, or have tried to, exceeds 250.”); TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND 
FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL 6 (2015), 
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL_2pager1.pdf [hereinafter 
HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT]; ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, AL-SHABAAB’S 
AMERICAN RECRUITS 1 
(2015), http://archive.adl.org/main_terrorism/al_shabaab_american_recruits.html - 
.V_qDmTuTWV4. 
3 See DAVID SHEDD, PAUL ROSENZWEIG, AND CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON, MAINTAINING 
AMERICA’S ABILITY TO COLLECT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: THE SECTION 702 PROGRAM 1 
(Heritage Foundation) (2016) [hereinafter THE SECTION 702 PROGRAM] (“Over the past several 
years, this surveillance of the online activities of foreigners has been an invaluable source of 
information for American intelligence professionals and officials.”); see also FISA Amendments 
Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8–9 (2016) Jt. Unclass. Stmt., Litt, 
Evans, Steinbach, Darby, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160907202002/https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/joint-sfr-for-doj-fbi-odni-and-nsa-updated.pdf; Permanent Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, FISA Amendments Act 
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that Section 702 collection offers valuable insights into the plans, objectives, 
and operations of terrorist organizations.4  For example, the NSA considers 
information acquired under Section 702 as the “most significant tool in the 
NSA collection arsenal for the detection, identification, and disruption of 
terrorist threats to the U.S. and around the world."5  Likewise, the former 
director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Mathew G. Olsen, 
testified that “Section 702 collection was instrumental to our efforts to 
discern the intentions and capabilities of our terrorist adversaries, 
contributing both to our strategic judgments and tactical insights.”6  Congress 
also recognizes that the intelligence obtained under Section 702 is essential to 
our national security,7 observing that this information is “often unique, 
unavailable from any other source, and regularly provides critically important 
insights and operationally actionable intelligence on terrorists and foreign 
intelligence targets around the world.”8 
Information acquired from Section 702 has aided the government’s 
efforts in preventing potential terrorist attacks.  For example, in September 
2009, information acquired pursuant to Section 702 was instrumental in 
                                                
Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. Rep. No. 112-645 Part 2, at 2 
(2012), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/house-report/645/2; 
see also NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, 
OVERSIGHT AND PARTNERSHIPS 5 (2013), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-
room/statements/2013-08-09-the-nsa-story.shtml (cited to in CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, 
IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702 20 (Hoover Inst., Stan. U.) (2016),  
http://www.hoover.org/research/defense-faa-section-702; see also Stmt. of Olsen, supra note 2, 
at 4. 
4 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 8–9.  
5 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 5 (citing INGLIS, supra note 3, at 1). 
6 Stmt. of Olsen, supra note 2, at 4. 
7 See THE SECTION 702 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 1 (“Over the past several years, this 
surveillance of the online activities of foreigners has been an invaluable source of information 
for American intelligence professionals and officials.”); see also FISA Amendments Act 
Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. Rep. No. 112–645, at 3 
(2012), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/house-report/645/2.  
8 See H.R. Rep. No. 112–645, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that information gathered under Section 
702 is “often unique, unavailable from any other source, and regularly provides critically 
important insights and operationally actionable intelligence on terrorists and foreign 
intelligence targets around the world”). 
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disrupting a terrorist attack on the New York City subway system.9  Using this 
information, the FBI identified and ultimately arrested Najibullah Zazi, a 
United States citizen living in the United States, for his role in an al-Qaeda 
plot to carry out suicide attacks on the New York City subway system.10  As 
another example, in 2008, information collected under Section 702 was used 
to uncover an al-Qaeda cell in Kansas City, Missouri that was in the initial 
stages of planning an attack on the New York Stock Exchange.11  Further, 
information obtained under Section 702 supported the arrest of David 
Coleman Headley, who had plotted to attack a Danish newspaper that had 
printed cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and who had helped plan the 
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.12 
Importantly, comprehensive safeguards are built into the FAA, 
particularly into Section 702, that protect the privacy interests of United 
States persons.13 Equally significant, the executive branch has established a 
                                                
9 See 9/11 REVIEW COMMISSION, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE FBI: PROTECTING THE 
HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 39 (2015). 
10 See id. 
11 See Aaron Katersky, James Gordon Meek, Josh Margolin, and Brian Ross, Al Qaeda's 
Abandoned NY Stock Exchange Plot Revealed, ABN NEWS (June 18, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaedas-abandoned-ny-stock-exchange-plot-
revealed/story?id=19431509 (quoting FBI Assistant Director Sean Joyce’s testimony before 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence); see also PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 108 (2014), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT]; see 
also Gia Vang, Kansas City Man Suspected in New York Terror Plot, FOX4KC.COM (June 18, 2013), 
http://fox4kc.com/2013/06/18/kansas-city-man-suspected-in-new-york-terror-plot/. 
12 See Four Declassified Examples from the NSA, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (2013), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140919065423/http://intelligence.house.gov/1-four-
declassified-examples-more-50-attacks-20-countries-thwarted-nsa-collection-under-fisa-section; 
see also David Coleman Headley Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark Terror 
Plots, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 24, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/david-coleman-
headley-sentenced-35-years-prison-role-india-and-denmark-terror-plots.  
13 This article focuses on modifying the scope of surveillance of United States person 
information, and accordingly, focuses on privacy protections of United States persons. Within 
the last several years, privacy protections of non-United States persons have expanded as well. 
For example, Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28) provides in pertinent part that: “All 
persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever 
they might reside, and persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their 
personal information. U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore, include appropriate 
safeguards for the personal information of all individuals, regardless of the nationality of the 
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history of compliance with the statutory requirements of Section 702 that 
preserve such privacy interests.  For example, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence found, based upon its numerous hearings and briefings since the 
enactment of Section 702, that Section 702 “has been implemented with 
attention to protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons, and has 
been the subject of extensive oversight” by all three branches of the 
government.14  Likewise, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB), a bipartisan oversight agency within the executive branch,15 found 
that the implementation of the Section 702 program has been subject to 
extensive oversight and concluded that there was “no evidence of intentional 
abuse.”16  Moreover, reports by the Attorney General (AG) and Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) indicate that the National Security Agency 
(NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Central Intelligence 
                                                
individual to whom the information pertains or where that individual resides.” Presidential Policy 
Directive – Signals Intelligence Activities (PPD–28), THE WHITE HOUSE (2014),  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-
signals-intelligence-activities. As another example, the FBI applies the "relevant provisions of 
PPD–28 to information it collects pursuant to FISA section 702" to further the principle that 
"all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or 
wherever they might reside, and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of 
their personal information." Presidential Policy Directive 28: Policies and Procedures, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE, 1 (2014), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ppd-28-policies-
procedures-signed.pdf. 
14 FAA Sunsets Extension Act of 2012, S. REP. NO. 112–174, at 2 (2012), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/senate-report/174/1.  
15 The PCLOB is “an independent, bipartisan agency within the executive branch” that “is 
vested with two fundamental authorities: (1) To review and analyze actions the executive 
branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring the need for such actions is 
balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties and (2) To ensure that liberty 
concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, 
regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.” PRIVACY 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, https://www.pclob.gov (last visited January 12, 
2017). The PCLOB was established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act, Pub. L. 110-53, signed into law in August 2007 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000ee). See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON 
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 2 (2014), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf  
[hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT] (explaining that its primary mission is to ensure 
that the executive branch’s efforts to protect the United States from terrorist activities are 
balanced with “the need to protect privacy and civil liberties”). 
16 PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. 
6 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF             Vol. 7, No. 1 
 
 
Agency (CIA) implemented procedures related to Section 702 in a manner 
that reflects a “focused and concerted effort” by the Intelligence Community 
to comply with the requirements of Section 702.17  Reviews have uniformly 
determined that the executive branch has not intentionally misused any of its 
authorities under Section 702 or intentionally violated any of the procedural 
safeguards that protect United States privacy interests.18 
                                                
17 Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, IC ON THE RECORD (most recent oversight reports publicly 
released on Aug. 11, 2016 and Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/section-702 (publicly releasing semiannual oversight 
reports dated March 2014, Oct. 2014, June 2015, Sept. 2015, Feb. 2016, and Nov. 2016). These 
reports have concluded that “the agencies have continued to implement the procedures and 
follow the guidelines in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency 
personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702.” In addition to the release of these 
oversight reports, ODNI publicly released minimization procedures. Release of 2015 Section 702 
Minimization Procedures, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, IC ON THE 
RECORD (August 11, 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/section-702  
[hereinafter Release of 2015 Section 702 Minimization Procedures] (publicly releasing minimization 
procedures issued pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act); see U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 
(2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015NSAMinimizationProcedures_Redacted.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN 
CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 
(2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015FBIMinimization_Procedures.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015NCTCMinimizationProcedures_Redacted.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 NCTC MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES USED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015CIAMinimizationProcedures_Redacted.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES]. 
18 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 1–2. It is 
noted, however, that in 2011, the government revealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC or FISA Court) that the NSA's upstream collection was much broader than the 
government had previously represented. Specifically, the government reported, for the first 
time, that it was collecting multi-communication transactions (MCTs) as part of its upstream 
collection. Based upon this new information, the FISC determined that NSA's minimization 
procedures, as the government proposed to apply them with respect to the retention of MCTs, 
did not comply with the statutory requirements. Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, *9 (FISA Ct. 
Oct. 3, 2011) (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1) and 1821(4)(A)). The FISC also determined that 
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The FAA is scheduled to sunset in December 2017.19  Some advocates 
contend that Section 702 should be renewed with tighter constraints placed 
upon executive branch authorities.20  Others emphasize the critical 
contribution that Section 702 has made in preventing terrorist attacks and 
advocate for the renewal of Section 702.21  In this article, I provide another 
view:  Section 702 should be strengthened.  Specifically, I propose that 
surveillance authorities should be strengthened to include the collection of 
foreign intelligence information on both United States and non-United States 
persons overseas without individualized judicial review for each collection, 
with additional safeguards for information collected on United States 
persons.22  Further, I recommend against placing further constraints upon the 
                                                
NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as the government proposed to implement them 
in connection with MCTs, were not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. To comply with 
the FISC's findings, the NSA modified its minimization procedures with respect to MCTs. 
Specifically, NSA restricted access to the portions of its upstream collection that were most 
likely to contain wholly domestic communications and non-target information that was subject 
to statutory or Fourth Amendment protection. Redacted, 2012 WL 9189263 *2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 
24, 2012) (citing Redacted, 2011 WL 10947772 *7–9 (FISA Ct. Nov. 30, 2011)). Procedures were 
also changed providing that all upstream acquisitions would be retained for a default maximum 
period of two years rather than five. The following month, the FISC found that the 
government adequately corrected the deficiencies and that the revised procedures complied 
with both the statute and the Fourth Amendment. Redacted, 2011 WL 10947772 (FISA Ct. Nov. 
30, 2011). Moreover, NSA purged all data in its repositories that had been identified as having 
been acquired through upstream collection before the October 31, 2011 effective date of the 
amended NSA minimization procedures approved by the FISC. Redacted, 2012 WL 9189263 *3. 
19 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a–1881g. For a comprehensive discussion of Section 702, including its 
history and evolution, see Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone 
and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 125 (2015). 
20 See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 
159 (Oxford University Press 2016) (“What is needed is more robust oversight, a stronger 
distinction between criminal law and national security, and a thoughtful reframing of the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.”) (emphasis in the original); Rainey Reitman, In Hearing on Internet 
Surveillance, Nobody Knows How Many Americans Impacted in Data Collection, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (May 10, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/hearing-internet-
surveillance-nobody-knows-how-many-americans-impacted-data (“Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act is set to sunset next year, which means Congress should be debating whether 
we benefit from renewing it at all...[A]bsent powerful reforms and safeguards for individual 
privacy, Congress should let Section 702 sunset altogether.”). 
21 See, e.g., Stmt. of Olsen, supra note 2, at 9 (“I urge the Committee to reauthorize Section 702 
to ensure that our intelligence and law enforcement communities have the tools they need to 
defend the nation.”); INGLIS, supra note 3 (providing a persuasive discussion of why Section 
702 should be reenacted). 
22 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (defining a “United States person” as “a citizen of the United States, 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101 (a)(20) of title 8), 
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government’s ability to query its own databases that may include Section 702 
information.  
My article is divided into five parts.  Part I traces the evolution of Section 
702.  Part II provides an overview of the constitutional parameters for the 
collection of foreign intelligence information.  It highlights the tension 
between the President’s constitutional mandate under Article II of the United 
States Constitution, e.g., protecting United States national security interests, 
and the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures by our government.23  Part III provides a framework for 
strengthening Section 702 and restoring certain executive branch authorities 
to where they had been prior to the 2008 FAA.  Part III also analyzes how 
the suggested changes to Section 702 are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment and protect United States person privacy interests.  Part IV 
addresses a recently proposed change to Section 702, namely placing 
additional constraints upon the government’s ability to query lawfully-
collected data under Section 702.  Part IV contends that current safeguards 
for querying such information are adequate and recommends against placing 
further limitations upon the government’s querying capabilities.  Finally, Part 
V applies the concepts set forth in Parts III and IV of this article to a 
hypothetical scenario.  In doing so, Part V endeavors to show the national 
security value of these recommendations and how United States privacy 
interests remain protected. 
 
                                                
an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the 
United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is 
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is 
a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section”). 
23 See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260, 266 (1990). In Verdugo, the 
Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment "was to protect the people of 
the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that 
the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens 
outside of the United States territory." Verdugo held that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
United States person or non-United States who have "come within the territory of, and have 
developed substantial connections with, this country." 
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I. EVOLUTION OF SECTION 702 
 
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
 
In the early 1970s, evidence that the executive branch had been misusing 
its intelligence and law enforcement authorities set the stage for congressional 
inquiry into executive branch activities.24  Following a prolonged public 
debate over the Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon resigned as President on 
August 9, 1974.25  Two years after Nixon’s resignation, the Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, known as the Church Committee, released reports documenting 
the executive branch’s misuse of its intelligence authorities within the United 
States.26  The Church Committee revealed that the CIA had construed its 
authorities to investigate domestic groups whose activities, including 
demonstrations, might have the potential to threaten CIA installations, 
recruiters, or contractors.27  The committee further reported that the FBI had 
engaged in illicit strategies of using the media to discredit civil rights activists, 
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah 
Muhammad.28  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
established a parallel committee known as the Pike Committee which was also 
troubled about the executive branch’s misuse of its authorities.29  Around the 
                                                
24 See, e.g., Strengthening Intelligence Oversight, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
3, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Church_Committee_Web
_REVISED.pdf. 
25 See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 1974), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/080974-
3.htm.  
26 See SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (CHURCH COMMITTEE), FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. 
REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I and bk. II (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE]. 
27 See id., bk. I, at 136–39. 
28 See id., bk. II, at 86–89. 
29 See Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA, Looking for a Rogue Elephant, 
CIA (Apr. 14, 2007, 12:22 PM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
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same time, the Supreme Court, in United States v. United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), while determining that the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement applied to the collection of intelligence 
related to domestic security, left open the question of the scope of the 
President's surveillance authority with respect to collecting foreign intelligence 
information.30  
Against this backdrop of misuse of intelligence authorities and an open 
constitutional question with respect to the collection of foreign intelligence 
information,  compromise legislation known as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act was enacted in 1978.31  When first enacted, FISA did not 
require judicial review for acquiring foreign intelligence information for 
persons abroad, including United States persons.32  Rather, Congress enacted 
FISA to govern “the use of electronic surveillance in the United States for 
intelligence purposes” and recognized that it did not “afford protections to 
                                                
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html; see also DONOHUE, 
supra note 20, at 7–8. 
30 See United States v. United States District Court for the E.D. of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 
308 (1972). 
31 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c). Under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e), 
“foreign intelligence information” is defined as: 
(e) “Foreign intelligence information” means— 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary 
to, the ability of the United States to protect against— 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network 
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, 
and if concerning a United States person is necessary to— 
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. 
32 See, e.g., DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & 
PROSECUTIONS 2D § 16:5 (2012); Congressional Record--Senate 110th Proceedings And Debates of the 
Congress, June 25, 2008 No. 106, Vol. 154, S6125, 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2008/06/25/CREC-2008-06-25.pdf (statement of Senator 
Hatch). 
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U.S. persons who are abroad.”33  With the enactment of the FAA in 2008, 
Congress limited executive branch authority to the collection of foreign 
intelligence information of United States persons abroad. 
In understanding the evolution of FISA and its application to United 
States persons abroad, it is necessary to consider the definition of electronic 
surveillance and its impact upon the method in which surveillance is 
conducted.  As described by Steven Bradbury, former head of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel, the original definition 
of electronic surveillance under FISA was narrow.34  In 1978, when FISA was 
enacted, the definition of electronic surveillance included the acquisition of 
content from a radio or wire communication when such acquisition occurred in 
                                                
33 Jonathan W. Gannon, From Executive Order to Judicial Approval: Tracing the History of Surveillance 
of U.S. Persons Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism Investigations, 59 GEORGETOWN J. OF NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 6, 71–72, http://jnslp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/03_Gannon_Master-1.pdf (quoting 154 CONG. REC. S257 (daily ed. 
Jan. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 22 
(emphasis added by Gannon)); Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding The NSA Programs: Bulk 
Acquisition of Telephone Metadata Under Section 215 And Foreign-Targeted Collection Under Section 702, 
LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 19 (Sept. 1, 2013), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf.  
34 Steven G. Bradbury, supra note 33 at 16. When FISA was first enacted, electronic surveillance 
was defined as:  
 “(1) the acquisition by, an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the 
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a 
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents 
are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under 
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a 
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;  
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of tile 
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, 
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United 
States;  
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance 
device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for 
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are 
located within the United States; or  
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other' surveillance device in 
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or 
radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement 
purposes.”  
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (1976). 
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the United States.35 At the time of FISA’s enactment, international 
communications were mainly transmitted by satellite, which fell outside of 
this definition.36  However, with the expanding use of the Internet in the 
1990s and 2000s, the way in which communications were transmitted evolved 
from satellite to undersea fiber optic cables.37  As a result, international 
electronic communications that were once outside the scope of FISA because 
they were not wire or radio communications now fell within its governance 
because the communications were transmitted through undersea fiber optic 
cables (e.g., a wire communication).38  
Laura Donohue, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, 
offers another explanation for the necessity for modernizing FISA.  She 
explained that when FISA was first enacted, “Congress explicitly exempted 
foreign-to-foreign wire communications from FISA’s remit.”39  As an 
example, Professor Donohue described that a communication from a British 
citizen in London calling a French citizen in Paris was not governed by FISA 
because that communication never entered the United States.40  She 
explained, however, that with the evolution of email communications, 
foreign-to-foreign communications originally exempted from FISA began to 
fall within its domain.41  She believed that it “would be impractical and 
cumbersome” to require the Intelligence Community to obtain judicial review 
for every interception of foreign intelligence between foreign nationals 
outside of the United States.42  Professor Donohue provided the following 
example to illustrate how evolving technology placed communications that 
                                                
35 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (1976); see also KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 16:5 (discussing the 
evolving definition of “electronic surveillance,” including its legislative history).  
36 See Bradbury, supra note 33, at 16. 
37 See id.  
38 See Bradbury, supra note 33, at 16–17; but see KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 16:4 (stating 
that the actual percentage of calls transmitted by satellite was between “one-half and two-
thirds”). 
39 DONOHUE, supra note 19, at 147. 
40 See id.  
41 See id. at 147–48. 
42 See id. at 147. 
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were once outside the scope of FISA within its governance.  
U.S. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) store e-mail on servers in the 
United States. The same British subject, if she accesses her email 
from London (pulling it from a server within the United States), 
suddenly falls within FISA—even when the e-mail she is retrieving is 
sent by the same French citizen in Paris. In other words, merely by 
using an American ISP, non-citizens could obtain the protections of 
the more rights protective FISA framework—even where such 
persons had no other ties to the United States and presented a classic 
foreign intelligence threat (and would otherwise be covered by the 
less rigorous contours of Executive Order 12,333).43 
 
As described by Mr. Bradbury and Professor Donohue, with evolving 
technologies more communications fell within the scope of FISA, including 
foreign-to-foreign communications.44  This development resulted in the need 
to seek approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to acquire 
such communications where previously such judicial review had not been 
required.45  Those who are familiar with the process of seeking FISC 
authorization to conduct surveillance explain the involved and time-
consuming process of seeking judicial authorization.46  As explained by the 
                                                
43 Id. at 147–48. 
44 See DONOHUE, supra note 19, at 147; see also Bradbury, supra note 33, at 16–17.  
45 See DONOHUE, supra note 19, at 147; see also Bradbury, supra note 33, at 16. 
46 See, e.g., The NSA Wiretapping Program, FOR THE RECORD, A PUBLICATION OF THE CENTER 
ON LAW AND SECURITY AT THE NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 1, 9 (2007), 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/nsa_jan_07.pdf. The statutory language 
of FISA itself illustrates the involved process of obtaining a probable cause order from the 
FISC to conduct surveillance. To seek FISC approval to acquire foreign intelligence 
information, the executive branch must submit an application to the FISC containing the 
statutorily required information and obtain the requisite approvals. The application must 
include a certification by a high-level executive branch official, e.g., Director or Deputy Director 
of a component of the Intelligence Community, such as the Director or Deputy Director of 
the FBI, certifying that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
intelligence information. 50 U.S.C § 1804(a)(6)(B). Further, for each application, the Attorney 
General or a DOJ designee, must review the application to determine whether it meets the 
statutory requirements. 50 U.S.C § 1804(d). In addition to this high-level review, each 
application must include, among other information: (1) description of the specific target of the 
electronic surveillance; (2) a statement of the facts relied upon by the applicant to justify his 
belief that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power, and each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is 
being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (3) a 
statement of the proposed minimization procedures; and (4) a description of the nature of the 
information sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the 
surveillance. 50 U.S.C §§ 1804(a)(2)–(5). 
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PCLOB, before an application for surveillance is submitted to the FISC, the 
executive branch conducts an extensive review of the application.47  The 
PCLOB described the process as follows:  
It is first reviewed by lawyers at the FBI, the NSA, or other agencies, 
and then by lawyers at the National Security Division of the 
Department of Justice (“NSD”), who present the government’s 
applications to the court. Review by the NSD frequently involves 
substantial back and forth between the agency seeking authorization 
and the DOJ lawyers, as the lawyers seek additional factual details 
about the target of the surveillance, technical information about the 
surveillance methodology, or assurances about how the information 
acquired will be used and disseminated. Agency personnel would say 
that at times these interactions are quasi-adversarial. At the 
conclusion of the process, the application will generally be quite 
lengthy and may have extensive supporting documentation, and it 
must be approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney 
General, or upon designation, the Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security.48 
 
Carrie Cordero, former DOJ and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) attorney who served in national security-related 
positions and is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center, noted that to request an individualized FISC order, “the bureaucratic 
manpower . . . to supply and check facts, prepare applications and present 
these matters to the Court [is] substantial.”49  Likewise, Michael McConnell, 
former Director of National Intelligence, stated that “it took ‘200 man hours’ 
to prepare an application ‘for one [telephone] number.’”50  
Further, as noted by scholars in a publication from the Center on Law 
and Security at the New York University (NYU) School of Law, it takes 
months for a FISA application to be processed due to the “endless editing 
                                                
47 See PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 15, at 177–78. 
48 Id. 
49 Carrie Cordero, The Brennan Center Report on the FISA Court and Proposals for FISA Reform, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/brennan-center-report-fisa-court-and-
proposals-fisa-reform.    
50 Chris Roberts, Transcript: Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 
22, 2007), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/elpasotimesmcconnelltranscript.pdf 
(quoting Michael McConnell, former National Intelligence Director). 
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and re-editing of documents by lawyers and bureaucrats.”51  Similarly, William 
E. Moschella, then Assistant Attorney General at the United States 
Department of Justice, described the process as follows:  “In order to obtain 
judicial review by the FISA court before conducting surveillance, the 
Government must assemble a voluminous application, obtain the approval of 
the Attorney General himself and senior administration national security 
officials, submit the materials to the court, and await its decision.”52  
 
B. President’s Surveillance Program 
 
As discussed above, the unintended consequence of evolving technology 
expanded the governance of FISA.  The tragic attacks of September 11, 2001 
precipitated a recognition of the need for the intelligence community to 
conduct surveillance of international communications and overseas targets 
with much greater speed and agility.  Seeking individual FISC orders to collect 
this type of foreign intelligence information was cumbersome and no longer 
proved feasible under the outdated version of FISA at the time.53  The 
President and NSA believed that the ability to conduct “fast, flexible, and 
                                                
51 See The NSA Wiretapping Program, supra note 46, at 13.  
52 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 16:10 (quoting Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice to F. Jams Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House 
Committee on the Judiciary). As provided in 50 U.S.C. § 1804(d):  
(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National 
Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General 
shall personally review under subsection (a) of this section an application under that 
subsection for a target described in section 1801(b)(2) of this title. 
(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make a request referred to in 
subparagraph (A), an official referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the 
authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph. 
(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with authority to make a request 
under that subparagraph shall take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that 
delegation of such authority is clearly established in the event such official is disabled 
or otherwise unavailable to make such request. 
53 See Modifying NSA Programs and Amending FISA Authorities, Open Hearing on Legislative Proposals 
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113 CONG. 12 (2013), 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/bradbury1029201
3.pdf (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
U.S. Department of Justice). 
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broad-scale signals intelligence of international communications" was 
necessary to identify and prevent further attacks in the United States.54  The 
structure of FISA at the time, however, encumbered the executive branch 
from achieving this objective.55 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, to quickly collect foreign 
intelligence information of international communications and targets abroad, 
President Bush authorized the executive agencies to conduct warrantless 
surveillance in a then highly-classified program referred to as the President’s 
Surveillance Program (PSP).56  One aspect of the program was the collection 
of the content of communications into and out of the United States—without 
judicial review—where it was reasonable to conclude that a member of Al-
Qaeda or a related terrorist group was a party to such communication.57 
Approximately four years after the inception of this surveillance program, the 
New York Times publicly disclosed the program in a December 16, 2005 
                                                
54 Id. at 12. 
55 See id. 
56 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 2009-0013-AS, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE 
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 1 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0907.pdf  
[hereinafter OIG REPORT]; see also The DOJ Releases Additional Documents Concerning Collection 
Activities Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks of September 11, 2001, 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/198-press-releases-2014/1152-the-
doj-releases-additional-documents-concerning-collection-activities-authorized-by-president-
george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,-2001?highlight=WzcwMl0. To 
provide a legal justification for the warrantless surveillance program, DOJ, Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, the only person in OLC who 
knew about the PSP from the start of the program in October 2001 until he left DOJ in May 
2003, drafted a memorandum to support the program. See OIG REPORT, at 10. In a November 
2, 2001 memorandum, Professor Yoo acknowledged that “FISA ‘purports to be the exclusive 
statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,’ but opined that 
‘[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article 
II authorities.’" Id. (quoting John Yoo, OLC Memorandum for the Attorney General, Nov. 2, 
2001, at 9). Professor Yoo believed that “the ultimate test of whether the government may 
engage in warrantless electronic surveillance activities is whether such conduct is consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA.” Id. at 11.  Professor 
Yoo’s memorandum, while providing legal justification for the program at the time, was later 
criticized as failing to consider significant legal issues. See id., at 11-14. 
57 See id. 
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article.58  Relying upon reports of anonymous government officials, the New 
York Times reported that:  "the intelligence agency has monitored the 
international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over 
the past three years in an effort to track possible 'dirty numbers' linked to Al 
Qaeda."59  The day after the program was revealed by the New York Times, 
President Bush delivered a radio address to discuss the surveillance program, 
explaining that he “authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with 
United States law and the Constitution, to intercept the international 
communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist 
organizations.”60 
Once this surveillance program became publicly known, controversy over 
the legality of the President’s Surveillance Program arose.  On one side of the 
                                                
58 See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-
callers-without-courts.html?_r=0. 
59 Id.  
60 President George W. Bush, Radio Address to the American People (Dec. 17, 2005), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html; see also 
OIG REPORT, supra note 56, at 1 (explaining that President Bush authorized the warrantless 
surveillance program “at intervals of approximately every 45 days”). For “each reauthorization 
the CIA and later the NCTC [The National Counterterrorism Center] prepared an assessment 
of current potential terrorist threats and a summary of intelligence gathered through the PSP 
and other means during the previous authorization period.” OIG REPORT, at 10, supra note 56 
at 6. Following receipt of the Intelligence Community’s assessment, the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel reviewed this information to assess whether there was "a 
sufficient factual basis demonstrating a threat of terrorist attacks in the United States for it to 
continue to be reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the President to 
[continue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved" in the program. Id.; see 154 CONG. 
REC. S6121 (daily ed. June 25, 2008), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2008/06/25/CREC-
2008-06-25.pdf (statement of Sen. Chambliss) (finding that in addition to DOJ review, 
Congressional leaders “kn[e]w about this program”); see 154 CONG. REC. S6117 (statement of 
Senator Bond) (“the big eight at the time—that is, the Republican and Democratic leaders of 
the House and the Senate and the leaders of their Intelligence Committees—were briefed on 
this program before it started.”). Shortly after the program began, on October 25, 2001, White 
House officials and then-NSA Director Michael Hayden briefed the Chairman and Ranking 
Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Nancy Pelosi and Porter 
Goss; and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
D. Robert Graham and Richard Shelby. Indeed, members of Congress were briefed 49 times 
about the PSP, “17 of which took place before the December 2005 media reports.” The 
Presiding Judge of the FISC was also briefed about the President’s Surveillance Program. OIG 
REPORT, at 10, supra note 56 at 16. 
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argument, the Department of Justice maintained that the President’s 
Surveillance Program was consistent with the executive branch’s statutory and 
constitutional authorities.61  In support of its position, DOJ maintained that 
under Article II of the Constitution, the President, including in his capacity as 
Commander in Chief, has the responsibility to protect the United States from 
future attacks, and the Constitution provides the President with the requisite 
authority to fulfill such obligation.62  DOJ believed that Congress 
supplemented this constitutional authority in the preamble to the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the War Powers 
Resolution.63  Specifically, DOJ asserted that the Supreme Court, in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, recognized that the AUMF authorized "fundamental incident[s] of 
waging war."64  After citing to examples of how intelligence gathering has 
been used as an integral part of engaging in war throughout history, DOJ 
contended that conducting surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence 
information against the enemy is a “fundamental incident” of the use of 
military force,65 and accordingly, authorized by the AUMF.  Based upon this 
analysis, DOJ concluded that, under Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, the 
President’s authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to acquire 
                                                
61 Letter from The Department of Justice, to Pat Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on 
Intelligence; Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence; John D. 
Rockefeller, Vice Chair, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence; Jane Harman, Ranking Minority 
Member, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005) (on file with the Office of 
Legislative Affairs) [hereinafter Letter from the Department of Justice].  
62 See id. at 2 (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863)) (stressing that if the Nation is 
invaded, "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist by force . . . without waiting 
for any special legislative authority"); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(Silberman, J. concurring) ("[T]he Prize Cases . . . stand for the proposition that the President 
has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific 
congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected."). 
63 See Letter from The Department of Justice, supra note 61, at 2–3 (citing to the AUMF of 
September 18, 2001, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)) ("[T]he President has authority under the 
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the 
United States."); War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) ("The constitutional powers of 
the President as Commander in Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities[] . . . [extend to] a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.")). 
64 Id. at 3 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 (plurality opinion), 587 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)) (2004). 
65 Id. 
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intelligence information under the PSP was “at its maximum."66  
On the other hand, some believed that conducting surveillance under the 
President’s Surveillance Program violated FISA and that reliance on the 
AUMF was improper.  One such view was expressed in a January 9, 2006 
letter from scholars of constitutional law and scholars who were former 
government officials to congressional leaders.67  The scholars directly 
countered DOJ’s contentions that the PSP was both statutorily and 
constitutionally sound.  One of the scholars’ principal assertions was that, 
based upon the statutory language of FISA and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), FISA 
was the exclusive means in which to conduct electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes.68  They asserted that the President acted 
“unilaterally and secretly” in violation of the explicit statutory language of 
FISA.69  They contended that all electronic surveillance in the United States is 
governed by FISA and the criminal code—not the AUMF.70  Further, the 
                                                
66 Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981)). 
67 See Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Professor of Law, Duke University, Former Counselor on 
International Law in the State Department Legal Adviser's Office; David Cole, Professor of 
Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Walter Dellinger, Professor of Law, Duke 
University, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Former Acting 
Solicitor General of the United States; Ronald Dworkin, Professor, New York University Law 
School; Richard Epstein, Professor, University of Chicago Law School, Peter and Kirsten 
Bedford Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; Harold Hongju Koh, Dean and Professor of 
International Law, Yale Law School, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, Former Attorney-Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ; Philip B. 
Heymann, Professor, Harvard Law School, Former Deputy Attorney General, Visiting 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Former Attorney Advisor, Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel; Beth Nolan, Former Counsel to the President, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Associate Counsel to the President, 
Attorney Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel; William S. Sessions, Former Director, FBI, Former 
Chief United States District Judge, Western District of Texas; Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor of 
Law, University of Chicago, Former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School and 
Provost of the University of Chicago; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Professor, Stanford Law School 
Former Dean, Stanford Law School; Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law 
School, William W. Van Alstyne, Professor, William and Mary Law School, Former Attorney, 
Department of Justice, to Congressional Leadership (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with author), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-response.pdf  [hereinafter Letter from Bradley et al. 
to Congressional Leadership]. 
68 See id. at 2. 
69 Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, at 3–4.  
70 See Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, at 3–4 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (emphasis added by constitutional scholars)).  
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scholars believed that it was unreasonable to interpret the AUMF as 
authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States during 
wartime because Congress had addressed that specific issue in FISA.71  Citing 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet, the scholars concluded that 
the President acted contrary to congressional intent, and accordingly, his 
authority was “at its lowest ebb."72  
Notably, in their letter the scholars recognized that had FISA, or any 
legislation, not been enacted governing the President’s authority to conduct 
surveillance, the President’s actions may have been consistent with his Article 
II powers.73  With respect to this issue, the scholars wrote: 
had Congress taken no action in this area, the President might well be 
constitutionally empowered to conduct domestic surveillance directly tied and 
narrowly confined to that goal—subject, of course, to Fourth Amendment 
limits. Indeed, in the years before FISA was enacted, the federal law 
involving wiretapping specifically provided that “[n]othing contained 
in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 
shall limit the constitutional power of the President . . . to obtain foreign 
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976).74  
 
However, the scholars maintained that FISA “specifically repealed” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(3) and replaced it with statutory language providing that FISA and the 
criminal code are the only authorities for conducting electronic surveillance.75  
DOJ and the scholars both raised persuasive legal arguments as to 
whether the President’s authority was “at its maximum" or “at its lowest ebb” 
                                                
71 See Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, at 3–4; see also 50 
U.S.C. § 1811 (discussing that FISA provides in pertinent part: “[T]he President, through the 
Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this title to 
acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days 
following a declaration of war”); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1829 (stating similar language for physical 
search). 
72 Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, at 4 (citing Youngstown, 
supra note 66, at 637). 
73 See Letter from The Department of Justice, supra note 61(arguing for the President’s 
constitutional authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance under Article II of 
the Constitution); see also Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, 
at 5–6. 
74 Letter from Bradley et al. to Congressional Leadership, supra note 67, at 6 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. 
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as described in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet concurrence.76  While the 
debate provided valuable insight into the President’s constitutional 
authorities, the question as to the legality of the President’s Surveillance 
Program was never officially resolved.77  The program ended on February 1, 
2007.78 
C. Protect America Act of 2007 
 
Once the PSP ended, the need still existed for the executive branch to 
obtain foreign intelligence information on persons abroad in an expeditious 
manner.  In response to this critical need, legislation was passed authorizing 
the executive branch to continue warrantless surveillance on international 
communications and persons located outside of the United States, including 
United States persons, to acquire foreign intelligence.79  Specifically, Congress 
passed legislation entitled the Protect America Act (PAA) which was enacted 
on August 5, 2007.80  The PAA (the predecessor to Section 702 of FAA) was 
                                                
76 Youngstown, supra note 66, at 635–38; see generally KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, at §§ 15:1–
15:13 (discussing the legality of the PSP). 
77 See, e.g., KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, at § 15:12 (“[T]he constitutional question of whether 
and how a statute may restrict the President’s power to conduct foreign intelligence 
surveillance remains very much alive.”). 
78 See EDWARD C. LIU, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 5 (2013) (citing 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2007 (FAA), S. REP. NO. 
110-209, at 4 (2007)); see also Letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Senate Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2007) and P.L. 110-55, 
50 U.S.C. §§1805(a)–1805(c)).  
79 See PAA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)-(c) (repealed), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
110publ55/html/PLAW-110publ55.htm. On August 3, 2007, the Senate approved the PAA, 
with 60 members voting in favor of the bill and 28 voting against it. The following day, on Aug 
4, 2007, the House approved the PAA, with 227 members voting in favor of the legislation and 
183 voting against it. See also S. 1927 (110th): Protect America Act of 2007, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/110-2007/h836. 
80 See id.; see also Pub. L. 110–261, Title IV, § 403(a)(1)(A), July 10, 2008, 122 Stat. 2473. The 
PAA expired in February 2008 and was repealed on July 10, 2008. The PAA established a 
statutory framework that authorized the executive branch to conduct warrantless surveillance 
of persons abroad to acquire foreign intelligence information. Specifically, to collect foreign 
intelligence information under the PAA, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the 
Attorney General (AG) could “for periods of up to one year authorize the acquisition of 
foreign intelligence information concerning [both U.S. and non-U.S.] persons reasonably believed 
to be outside the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(a) (repealed). Before approving the 
acquisition of the foreign intelligence information, the DNI and AG were required to 
determine whether the acquisition met certain factors. For example, the DNI and AG were 
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a stopgap measure with a sunset date of 180 days after the date of its 
enactment.81  Subject to certain conditions, the PAA authorized the collection 
of foreign intelligence surveillance on individuals (including United States 
persons) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States without 
individualized judicial review for each acquisition.82  Under the PAA, the 
executive branch was permitted to acquire foreign intelligence information of 
any persons outside of the United States including United States persons, without a 
probable cause order from the FISC.83  In passing the legislation, one 
Congressman noted that the PAA “takes the 1978 law, it provides the same 
protection for Americans that they had in 1978 and 1988 and 1998.  And 
now, as we approach 2008, it just simply lets us have the definitions of the 
law meet the technology of the time.  This monitors the communication of 
people who are initiating their communication in a foreign country.”84 
Importantly, to protect United States person privacy interests, the PAA 
                                                
required to determine: (1) “reasonable procedures are in place for determining that the 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerns persons reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States,” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(a)(1) (repealed); (2) “the acquisition 
does not constitute electronic surveillance,” 50 U.S.C. § 1805B(a)(2) (repealed); (3) “the 
acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance 
of a communications service provider,” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(a)(3) (repealed); (4) “a significant 
purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information,” 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(B)(a)(4) (repealed); and (5) “the minimization procedures to be used with respect to such 
acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).” 
50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(a)(5) (repealed). 
81 See S. 1927 (110th): Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–55, § 6(c), 121 Stat 552, 557. 
82 See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 
1006 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) [hereinafter In re Directives] (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b)(a)); see also 
KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, at § 16:15 (citing Pub. L. No 110–55, 121 Stat. 52 (2007)). The 
PAA “allowed warrantless surveillance of international communications to or from the United 
States, even when acquired from a wire or cable (or an e-mail server) inside the United States; 
and it allowed warrantless surveillance of foreign-to-foreign e-mail messages acquired from 
storage on servers located in the United States.” 
83 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(a) (repealed) (emphasis added); see also In re Directives, supra note 82, at 
1004 (“The PAA allowed the government to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence 
surveillance on targets (including United States persons) ‘reasonably believed’ to be located 
outside the United States.”); see also EDWARD C. LIU, SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS OUTSIDE 
THE UNITED STATES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
ACT (FISA), CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44457 (2016), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R44457.pdf. 
84 Roy Blunt, Congressman, House of Representatives, Floor Speech: Protect America Act of 
2007 (Aug. 4, 2007).  
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(as well as Section 702) contained multiple layers of procedural safeguards.  
For example, the PAA required the application of minimization procedures 
which are procedures designed to balance the privacy interests of United 
States persons with the government’s ability to acquire, retain, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information.85  Privacy interests were also 
protected through the PAA’s oversight procedures.  For example, on a semi-
annual basis, the AG was required to submit a report to the Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees in both the House and Senate that included a 
description of non-compliance incidents and the number of certifications and 
directives issued during the reporting period.86  Further, the DNI and AG 
were required to conduct reviews assessing the executive branch’s compliance 
with the minimization procedures and submit their findings to the relevant 
congressional committees.87   
The constitutionality of the application of the PAA was challenged in In 
re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.  In this case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
(FISCR or FISA Court of Review), the appellate court of review for the FISC, 
determined that a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement existed because the surveillance at issue was conducted 
to acquire foreign intelligence information for national security purposes and 
was “directed against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States.”88 After concluding that 
there was a foreign intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause, the FISCR 
                                                
85 See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 16:2. Minimization procedures, which play an integral 
role in protecting privacy interests of United States person, must be “reasonably designed . . . 
to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly 
available information concerning unconsenting United States persons.” See also 50 U.S.C. § 
1801(h)(1); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(e)(1); see also In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1015.  
86 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(4)(1) (2007) (repealed 2008). 
87 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(d). The DNI and AG were required to submit their findings to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
88 In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012; for further discussion of In re Directives, see Part III.C of 
this article. 
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then considered whether the surveillance conducted under the PAA was 
consistent with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  
In conducting this evaluation, the FISCR employed the “totality of the 
circumstances” test to evaluate whether the governmental action was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, weighing the government’s 
national security interests with individual privacy interests.89 The FISCR 
recognized that “relevant governmental interest—the interest in national 
security—is of the highest order of magnitude.”90  The FISCR further stated 
that there was a strong likelihood that mandating a warrant would “hinder the 
government's ability to collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would 
impede the vital national security interests that are at stake.”91  After weighing 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests with the national security interests at 
issue, the FISCR determined that the protections afforded to the privacy 
rights of targeted persons were reasonable in light of the government’s 
national security interests.92  Thus, the FISCR concluded that the warrantless 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information under the PAA—including the 
warrantless surveillance of United States persons outside of the United 
States—was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.93 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Id. (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9, 
(1985); see In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1013). The FISCR believe that the following 
governmental safeguards provided for the protection of individual privacy interests: "targeting 
procedures, minimization procedures, a procedure to ensure that a significant purpose of a 
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, procedures incorporated through 
Executive Order 12333 § 2.5, and [redacted text] procedures [redacted text] outlined in an 
affidavit supporting the certifications." 
90 Id. at 1012 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 
746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)). 
91 Id. at 1011 (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980)) 
(“explaining that when the object of a surveillance is a foreign power or its collaborators, ‘the 
government has the greatest need for speed, stealth, and secrecy’”). 
92 See id. at 1013.  
93 See id. at 1016. 
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D. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
 
With a sunset date of 180 days after the date of the enactment,94 and a 
fifteen day extension,95 the PAA expired in February 2008.96  On July 10, 
2008, the successor statute of the PAA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
(FAA), was enacted.97  The FAA was a compromise bill and adopted many of 
the same standards as the PAA.98  As will be discussed in more detail below, 
the most well-known provision of the FAA, Section 702, authorizes the 
executive branch to acquire foreign intelligence information of non-United 
States persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States 
without seeking individualized FISC orders for each acquisition.99  Sections 
703 (acquisitions inside the United States), 704 (other acquisitions), and 705 
(information located both inside and outside the United States) established 
procedures requiring the executive branch to obtain probable cause FISC 
orders to collect foreign intelligence information of United States persons 
located outside of the United States.100  
Notably, the initial draft FAA legislation passed by the House of 
Representatives to replace the PAA authorized the surveillance of any person 
abroad without individualized orders, including United States persons.101  
                                                
94 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(B)(c) (repealed); see also Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 81. 
95 See Gannon, supra note 33, at 84. 
96 See LIU, supra note 78, at 5. 
97 See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881(a)–1881(g) (listing of the provisions adopted under the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008); H.R. 6304 (110th), House vote: FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/110-2008/h437. The FAA passed Congress with a 
strong majority in favor of the bill. On June 20, 2008, the FAA passed the House with 293 
members voting in favor of the legislation and 129 voting against it. Several weeks later, 69 
Senators voted in favor of the FAA and 28 voted against it. See generally Gannon, supra note 33, 
at 69-80. President Bush signed the bill into law on July 10, 2008.  
98 See 154 CONG. REC. S618S6118 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Bond), 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2008/06/25/CREC-2008-06-25.pdf. 
99 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(a). 
100 See id. § 1881(b)–(d). 
101 See Gannon, supra note 33, at 81, (citing Elizabeth B. Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act: Comparison of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773 and the House 
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773 (Cong. Research Serv., RL34,533), (July 
7, 2008)); Elizabeth B. Bazan, Cong. Research Serv., RL34279, The Foreign Intelligence 
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When the House of Representatives first passed successor legislation to the 
Protect America Act in November 2007, the legislation did not require 
individualized judicial review to conduct surveillance for United States 
persons overseas.102  Rather, at a subsequent time, Senators Ron Wyden, Russ 
Feingold, and Sheldon Whitehouse introduced legislation requiring judicial 
review of the surveillance of United States persons abroad,103 an amendment 
referred to as the “Wyden Amendment.”104  Those in favor of the Wyden 
Amendment believed that Americans’ rights should not diminish when 
located outside of the United States.105  Those opposing the amendment 
pointed out that the executive branch had not abused its authorities in 
collecting foreign intelligence information on United States persons abroad 
under Executive Order 12333, Section 2.5, which had governed the 
acquisition of information relating to United States persons abroad before the 
FAA.106  
Critics of the Wyden Amendment voiced misgivings about broadening 
                                                
Surveillance Act: A Brief Overview of Selected Issues (2008), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101789.pdf. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. (citing FAA, S. REP. NO. 110-209, supra note 78, at 29). 
104 FAA, S. REP. NO. 110-209, supra note 78, at 29 (statement of Sen. Chambliss) (“Senator 
Wyden introduced, and [SSCI] adopted, an amendment requiring that any time a U.S. person is 
the target of surveillance, regardless of where the collection occurs, the Attorney General must 
seek FISC approval for that collection.”). 
105 See id. (quoting FAA, S. REP. NO. 110–209, supra note 78, at 50, (minority views of Senators 
Feingold and Wyden). 
106 See id. (citing FAA, S. REP. NO. 110–209, supra note 78, at 39, 50 (additional views of 
Senators Bond, Chambliss, Hatch and Warner). Mr. Gannon also noted that some senators 
believed that the amendment was “an attempt by Congress to micromanage the Intelligence 
Community.” see also KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 17:14 (noting that until the FAA, the 
acquisition of information relating to United States persons abroad “was not regulated by any 
statute—it was outside FISA’s definition of ‘electronic surveillance’ and ‘physical search,’ and 
therefore not subject to the exclusivity provision or the statute’s civil and criminal penalty 
provision for unauthorized acquisition. Instead, such acquisition was conducted under Section 
2.5 of Exe. Order No. 12333.” EO 12333, as amended, section 2.5, provides in pertinent part 
that “The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence 
purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique 
for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided 
that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in 
each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.” Exec. Order No. 12333, United States Intelligence 
Activities, as amended by Exec. Order Nos. 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008). 
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the scope of judicial review for the collection of foreign intelligence 
information on those outside of the United States.  For example, Kenneth 
Wainstein, then Assistant Attorney General, expressed concerns that the 
Wyden Amendment “would extend the role of the FISA Court, for the first 
time, outside our borders” by mandating judicial review for the surveillance of 
United States persons who were acting as agents of a foreign power outside 
the United States.107  Similarly, Patrick Philbin, former Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel noted:  “In 
light of the limited purpose for which surveillance of U.S. citizens overseas is 
conducted, coupled with the lack of evidence of abuse, there is no reason to 
impair the flexibility of highly sensitive intelligence and counterterrorism 
investigations by adopting a warrant requirement in this context.”108 
Eventually, the Wyden Amendment was adopted into the language of the 
FAA.  In passing the FAA, members of Congress recognized that they were 
expanding the scope of the FISC by requiring, for the first time, individual 
FISC orders finding probable cause to acquire foreign intelligence 
information of United States person outside of the United States.109  Prior to 
the enactment of the FAA, the surveillance of United States persons overseas 
remained principally within the executive branch’s discretion and was 
                                                
107 FISA Amendments: How to Protect Americans’ Security and Privacy and Preserve the Rule 
of Law and Government Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of then Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Wainstein)). 
108 Id. (statement of Patrick Philbin, former Deputy Assistant Atty. General Department of 
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel)). 
109 Under the FAA, “for the first time, a court order must be obtained to conduct electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes against an American who is located outside the 
United States.” 154 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Chambliss). 
Indeed, the FAA, Section 702 “went farther than any legislation in history in protecting the 
privacy interests of American citizens or U.S. persons whose communications might be 
acquired through targeting overseas.” 154 CONG. REC. S6118 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Bond). As noted by Professor Donohue, “Congress itself was intensely 
aware that in passing the FAA, it was invoking its authority under separation of powers 
doctrine, to limit the scope of executive action when it came to gathering foreign intelligence.” 
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, supra note 19, 
at 204. 
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conducted under Section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333.110  The FAA was a  
“significant departure” from the way in which the executive branch had 
conducted surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information.111  As 
explained by Professor Donohue, the “FAA altered the status quo, requiring 
the government to go to a court to obtain an individualized order, prior to 
targeting a U.S. person overseas.”112  Professor Donohue further noted that 
the FAA was fundamentally different from how FISA had previously worked 
and introduced new statutory restrictions in a field previously under the 
purview of Executive Order 12333, Section 2.5.113  The FAA eliminated the 
executive branch’s ability to conduct surveillance of United States persons 
abroad to collect foreign intelligence information without first seeking judicial 
approval.   
 
E. FAA Section 702, Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United 
States Other than United States Persons 
 
1. Certification to the FISC 
 
To understand FAA Section 702 and its procedural safeguards, a brief 
overview if its statutory framework is provided in this section.  Prior to 
                                                
110 See Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, supra 
note 19, at 80; see also KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 16:6 (explaining that prior to 2008, “if a 
U.S. citizen traveled to Paris and telephoned another U.S. citizen in London, the U.S. 
government was always able (as a legal matter) to monitor the call without a warrant under 
FISA. And that was the case regardless of where the government did the monitoring—i.e., even 
if the call was routed through the United States and wiretapped here”). 
111 Gannon, supra note 33, at 60, 69 (citing 154 CONG. REC. S257 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Rockefeller)). Before the enactment of the FAA in 2008, the surveillance of 
United States persons abroad was governed by Executive Order 12333. As noted by Kris and 
Wilson, the FAA “largely displaces Section 2.5 [of EO 12333] by subjecting surveillance and 
searches of U.S. persons abroad to approval by the FISC.” KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 
17:1. As reflected in the legislative history of the FAA, Congress knew that it was expanding 
FISA’s reach to United States persons abroad, noting for example that the FAA “ensures that 
the Government cannot conduct electronic surveillance on an American anywhere in the world 
without a warrant. No legislation has done that up to this point.” 154 CONG. REC. S6119 (daily ed. 
June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis added). 
112 Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, supra note 
19, at 204. 
113 See id. at 154; see also KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 17:14. 
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collecting information under Section 702, the Attorney General and Director 
of National Intelligence must submit a written certification to the FISC, 
attesting, among other factors that: (1) targeting and minimization procedures 
are in place, they have been approved by the FISC, and they are consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment;114 (2) procedures are in place to ensure 
compliance with the limitations of Section 702;115 (3) “a significant purpose of 
the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information;”116 and (4) “the 
acquisition involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or with 
the assistance of an electronic communication service provider.”117  Section 
702 explicitly prohibits the intentional targeting of: (1) “any person known at 
the time of acquisition to be located in the United States;” (2) “a person 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of 
such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to 
be in the United States;” (3) “a United States person reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States;” or (4) “any communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to 
be located in the United States.”118  Further, Section 702 mandates that 
acquisitions under this statute must comply with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.119  
 
2. Minimization Procedures 
 
Before conducting surveillance under Section 702, minimization 
procedures must be submitted to the FISC for review and approval.  
Minimization procedures are statutorily required procedures that are designed 
                                                
114 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iv). 
115 Id. § 1881(a)(g)(2)(A)(iii). 
116 Id. § 1881(a)(g)(2)(A)(v). 
117 Id. § 1881(a)(g)(2)(A)(vi). 
118 Id. § 1881(a)(b)(1)–(4). 
119 Id. § 1881(a)(b)(5). 
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to ensure that United States person information is protected.120  The 
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of non-publicly available United 
States person information collected under Section 702 must comply with 
minimization procedures to protect United States persons privacy interests.121  
For example, with respect to the retention of data, under the NSA Section 
702 minimization procedures, if information acquired under Section 702 has 
not been determined to be foreign intelligence information or evidence of a 
crime, such information generally ages off NSA systems within five years of 
the expiration of the certification.122  If the Section 702 information has been 
acquired from the NSA’s upstream collection, the data generally ages off NSA 
systems within two years of the expiration of the certification.123  With respect 
to the dissemination of Section 702 information, under the FBI Section 702 
minimization procedures United States person information may only be 
disseminated if the information “reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence 
information,” “necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or 
assess its importance,” or “reasonably appears to be evidence of a crime.”124   
 
 
 
                                                
120 As defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h), minimization procedures are “specific procedures, which 
shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose 
and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and 
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h). 
121 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(c)(1). 
122 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
123 See id.; for a description of “upstream” collection, see Part I.E of this article. 
124 FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 1, 30-31; CIA MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 17, 1, 4 (The CIA minimization procedures contain similar language in 
that they only permit the dissemination of a United States person’s identity if “such person’s 
identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance.”); 
NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, 1, 14–15 (NSA’s minimization procedures 
contain similar language as well); see Release of 2015 Section 702 Minimization Procedures, supra note 
17.  On August 11, 2016, the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, released 
the 2015 NSA Section 702 Minimization Procedures, 2015 FBI Section 702 Minimization 
Procedures, 2015 CIA Section 702 Minimization Procedures, and 2015 NCTC Section 702 
Minimization Procedures. 
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3. Targeting Procedures 
 
In addition to minimization procedures, targeting procedures must be 
followed.  Targeting procedures require that the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence information is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States, and must prevent the intentional 
acquisition of any communication in which both the sender and intended 
recipients of the communications are known to be in the United States at the 
time of the acquisition.125  NSA’s targeting procedures require that the 
selector, such as an email address or telephone number, is used by a non-
United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States.126  An NSA analyst must carefully review information in the NSA’s 
possession to determine whether a potential target is a non-United States 
person outside of the United States and document such decision.127  Once an 
NSA analyst has concluded that a potential target is a non-United States 
person overseas, two senior NSA analysts must approve the determination.128  
NSA’s decision is subsequently reviewed by the Department of Justice.129   
 
4. FISC Review of Section 702 Certification Request 
 
Following the required submissions to the FISC, the court reviews the 
certification packet to ensure that it meets the statutory requirement.130  For 
example, the FISC must ensure that the targeting and minimization 
                                                
125 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(d)(1). 
126 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
127 See id. at 5; see also Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between National 
Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Oversight, 114th CONG. 
2 (2016) (statement of David Medine, Former Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20160510-SJC%20Medine%20Testimony.pdf. 
128 See Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between National Security, Privacy and 
Civil Liberties, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Oversight, supra note 127, at 2. 
129 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 5. 
130 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(i). 
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procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.131  If the FISC 
believes that the government’s submissions are inadequate, the FISC requires 
that the government provide additional information.132  The FISC must 
evaluate the government’s submissions to determine whether a proposed 
certification meets all statutory and constitutional requirements.133  If the 
Court finds that submitted certification complies with these requirements, the 
FISC will approve the government’s certification.134  
 
5. Acquisition of Information under Section 702 
 
If the FISC is satisfied that the statutory and constitutional requirements 
are met and approves the government’s certification, the AG and DNI may 
issue a directive to an electronic communications service provider requiring 
its assistance to “immediately provide the Government with all information, 
facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in a manner 
that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition” and maintain “any records 
concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such electronic 
communication service provider wishes to maintain.”135  After the 
government issues such a directive, the government can then identify specific 
selectors, such as telephone numbers or email addresses, that are associated 
                                                
131 See id. 
132 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 4; § 
1881(a)(g)(1)(B) (If “time does not permit the submission of a certification” as described 
above, the AG and DNI may authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information of 
non-U.S. persons outside of the United States without prior judicial approval. However, within 
seven days of making such determination, the AG and DNI must submit a certification to the 
FISC seeking such authorization”); see also Redacted, 2011 WL 10947772, supra note 18 
(discussing that in 2011, the FISC determined that NSA's targeting and minimization 
procedures, as the government proposed to implement them in connection with MCTs, were 
not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. After the NSA modified its minimization 
procedures, the FISC found that the government adequately corrected the deficiencies and that 
the revised procedures complied with both the statute and the Fourth Amendment).  
133 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 4. 
134 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(i)(3)(A; see also Case Redacted, Mem. Op. and Order (FISA Ct. Nov. 
6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-
702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf.  
135 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(h)(1)(A)-(B). 
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with targeted persons.136  A provider has complete civil immunity for 
providing assistance to the government pursuant to a directive.137  Further, a 
provider has the option of challenging a directive by filing a petition with the 
FISC.138 
Information is collected under Section 702 in two ways: “PRISM” and 
“Upstream.”139  
1. In PRISM collection, the government identifies a specific user’s 
account that it seeks to monitor, and then sends a selector, such 
as an email address or telephone number, to the appropriate 
electronic communications service provider to begin 
collection.140  
 
2. Under upstream collection, NSA acquires electronic 
communications as they cross the Internet “backbone” within 
the United States. 141  Upstream collection allows the NSA to 
collect electronic communications that contain the targeted 
selector—such as an e-mail address—within the body of a 
communication between two third parties.  This method of 
collection, often referred to as an “abouts” collection.142 NSA 
also conducts upstream collection to acquire “telephony calls.”143  
In contrast to the upstream collection of Internet 
communications (e.g., emails), NSA’s upstream collection of 
telephony calls “only acquires communications that are to or 
from a specified telephone number of similar selector, not 
communications that are ‘about’ the tasked telephone 
                                                
136 See Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 1, 7 (July 2, 2014), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf; see also Jewel v. National Security Agency, No. 
C 08–04373, WL 545925, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015) (detailing further background on the 
steps of the process). 
137 See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 17:10 (citing to 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(h)(3)). 
138 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(h)(4). For further discussion of challenging a directive, see KRIS & 
WILSON, supra note 32, § 17:10. 
139 United States v. Hasbajrami, 11-CR-623 (JG), 2016 WL 1029500, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 
2016) (citing PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 7, 33). 
140 See id. (citing PCLOB SECTION 702, supra note 11, at 32–33). 
141 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 5. For 
example, with upstream collection, both “messages sent to and from a target’s e-mail address, 
like BadGuy@ISP.com, [as well as] messages sent between non-targets that mention 
BadGuy@ISP.com (the e-mail address, not merely the name)” are collected. For further an in-
depth description of “PRISM” and “upstream” collection, see Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, 
supra note 18; see also Redacted, 2011 WL 10947772, supra note 18. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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number.”144 
 
6. Oversight of Surveillance under Section 702 
 
Extensive oversight of the implementation of Section 702 is conducted 
by all three branches of the government.145  As recognized by Robert Litt, 
General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Intelligence Community is committed to ensuring that its acquisition and use 
of Section 702 is “consistent with the law, the FISC’s orders, and the 
protection of the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.”146  Congressionally 
mandated reports and audits concerning Section 702 include: 
• At least every six months, the Attorney General and Director of 
National Intelligence must submit a report to the FISC and relevant 
congressional committees assessing compliance with the targeting 
and minimization procedures;147 
 
• The Inspector General of the Department of Justice and the 
Inspector General of each element of the intelligence community 
authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information under Section 
702 must conduct certain reviews.  The OIG is required to provide a 
copy of each such review to the Attorney General, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and relevant congressional committees.148  
                                                
144 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 5. 
145 Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, supra note 
19, at 140 (“The FAA created numerous reporting requirements.”); 154 CONG. REC. S6126 
(daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  As noted by Senator Hatch in the 
legislative history of the FAA, built into the statutory scheme are many layers of oversight 
regulating the collection of information under Section 702. Senator Hatch detailed the 
“multiple oversight initiatives” placed in Section 702, including “audits conducted by the 
Inspector Generals of the Department of Justice and elements of the Intelligence Community, 
the Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence.” Senator Hatch believed that the 
level of oversight was so “onerous” that “the amount of oversight in this bill should be 
revisited in the future . . . to mandate more realistic and appropriate levels of review.” Senator 
Hatch continued: “The multiple oversight initiatives in this legislation are not fulfilled by 
magic. It takes a tremendous amount of time and resources by the very analysts whose primary 
job is to track terrorists. As great as our analysts are, they can’t be two places at once. There are 
only so many of them, and they don’t have unlimited resources.”  
146 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 7. 
147 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(l)(1) (requiring that reports to Congress be submitted to the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, 
and the House and Senate Committee on the Judiciary).  
148 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(l)(2). The OIGs must review the number of: (1) “disseminated 
intelligence reports containing a reference to a United States-person identity;” and (2) targets 
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• The head of each element of the intelligence community conducting 
an acquisition authorized under Section 702 must conduct an annual 
review to determine certain information about its Section 702 
collection.  The annual report must be provided to the FISC, 
Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and relevant 
congressional committees.149 
 
• At least every six months, the Attorney General must submit a report 
to the relevant congressional committees containing information 
including any certifications submitted, any directives issued, a 
description of the judicial review of such certifications and targeting 
and minimization procedures, any compliance reviews conducted by 
the Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence, and a 
description of any incidents of noncompliance.150  
 
In addition to these congressionally mandated reviews and reports, 
other oversight requirements and safeguards include:  
• Approximately every two months, DOJ, NSD and ODNI conduct 
compliance reviews of the NSA, FBI, and CIA's application of its 
Section 702 minimization and/or targeting procedures.151  DOJ 
reports all noncompliance incidents with the implementation of 
Section 702 to the FISC and and relevant congressional committees.  
 
• Under Rule 13 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, the government must 
report non-compliance incidents to the FISC of any FISC-approved 
authorities that were "implemented in a manner that did not comply 
with the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law."152 
• The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board conducted an 
extensive review of the government’s use of Section 702 and issued a 
comprehensive report on July 2, 2014, entitled, Report on the 
                                                
that were later determined to be located in the United States and, to the extent possible, 
whether communications of such targets were reviewed.”  
149 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(l)(3). The annual review must provide, information such as the number 
of “disseminated intelligence reports containing a reference to a United States-person identity” 
and “the number of targets that were later determined to be located in the United States.”  
150 50 U.S.C. § 1881(f) (requiring that reports must be submitted to the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House 
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary). 
151 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17.  
152 UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
Rule 13 
(2010), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20Rules%20of%20Procedure.
pdf [hereinafter FISC RULES OF PROCEDURE].  
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Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.153 
• Under Executive Orders 12333, as amended, and 13462, as amended, 
the head of each element of the intelligence community must report 
intelligence activities of their respective element to the President’s 
Intelligence Oversight Board that they have reason to believe may be 
unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive.154 
 
• Judicial review in other courts “where Section 702 obtained or 
derived information has been used against criminal defendants.”155 
 
In sum, Section 702 governs the surveillance of non-United States 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to collect 
foreign intelligence information.156  Collection under Section 702 does not 
require individual judicial orders authorizing the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence information against each individual.157  Rather, the FISC considers 
whether the statutory and constitutional requirements for the certification 
have been met, and if satisfied, approves the annual certifications submitted 
by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.158  
Pursuant to the certifications, and subject to FISC-approved targeting and 
minimization procedures and a rigorous oversight regime, the government is 
able to acquire foreign intelligence information on non-United States person 
overseas without obtaining FISC approval for each individual collection.  
 
F. FAA Section 703 (Acquisition Inside the United States Targeting United States 
Persons Outside the United States), Section 704 (Other Acquisitions Targeting United 
                                                
153 PCLOB SECTION 702, supra note 11.  
154 Exec. Order No. 12333, as amended, supra note 106; President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and 
Intelligence Oversight Board, Exec. Order No. 13462, as amended by Exec. Order 13516 (2009). 
155 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 8; see, e.g., 
Mem. Opinion and Order, supra note 134; United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 
2014 WL 2866749 (D. Or., June 24, 2014), aff'd, United States. v. Mohamud, No. 14-30217, 
2106 WL 7046751 (9th Cir., Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/12/05/14-30217.pdf; Hasbajrami, supra 
note 139. 
156 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(a) (2008). 
157 Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE, IC ON THE RECORD, https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/topics/section-702. 
158 Id. 
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States person Outside the United States), Section 705 (Joint Applications and Concurrent 
Authorizations) 
 
While Section 702 governs the collection of foreign intelligence 
information of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States, Sections 703, 704, and 705 govern the collection of 
foreign intelligence information of United States persons located outside of the 
United States.  Section 703 (50 U.S.C. § 1881b) and Section 704 (50 U.S.C. § 
1881c) may be used to acquire foreign intelligence information of a United 
States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.159  
Before issuing an order authorizing the collection of such information under 
Sections 703 and 704, the FISC must make a probable cause finding that the 
target is: (1) “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;”160 
and (2) “a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or 
employee of a foreign power” as defined in FISA.161 The FISC must also 
                                                
159 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b)(a); § 1881(c)(a)–(c). 
160 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b). 
161 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b)(b)(1)(C)(ii); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(c)(b)(3)(B). Under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b), 
“agent of a foreign power” is defined as: 
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-- 
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, 
or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this 
section, irrespective of whether the person is inside the United States; 
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine 
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the 
United States, when the circumstances indicate that such person may 
engage in such activities, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any 
person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any 
person to engage in such activities; 
(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; 
(D) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, or activities in preparation therefor; or 
(E) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, or activities in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a 
foreign power, or knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of 
such proliferation or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly 
conspires with any person to engage in such proliferation or activities in 
preparation therefor; or 
(2) any person who-- 
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or 
on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a 
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
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determine that the proposed minimization procedures are sufficient under 
these sections.162  When the government seeks to collect foreign intelligence 
information on a United States person abroad, and expects to collect the 
information both inside and outside of the United States, the FISC can 
authorize both collections under Section 705.163  
 
G. Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act 
 
On December 30, 2012, Congress reauthorized the FAA for five years.164  
Other than extending the expiration date of the statute, no other substantive 
modifications were made.  In reauthorizing Section 702, Congress noted that 
it was necessary to extend Section 702 because the intelligence acquired under 
Section 702 is essential to maintaining our national security.  Congress 
believed that the information collected under Section 702 is “often unique, 
unavailable from any other source, and regularly provides critically important 
insights and operationally actionable intelligence on terrorists and foreign 
intelligence targets around the world.”165  Additionally, based upon numerous 
briefings, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that: 
                                                
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a 
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence 
activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve 
or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United 
States; 
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities 
that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; 
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity 
for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, 
knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a 
foreign power; or 
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities 
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any 
person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).  
162 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(c)(c)(1)(C). 
163 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(d)(a). 
164 See FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, House Report 112-645, 2d Session 
Part 2 (2012), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/house-
report/645/2 (discussing H.R. 5949) 
165 Id. 
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the authorities provided under the FISA Amendments Act have 
greatly increased the government's ability to collect information and 
act quickly against important foreign intelligence targets.  The 
Committee has also found that Title VII has been implemented with 
attention to protecting the privacy and civil liberties of United States 
persons, and has been the subject of extensive oversight by the 
Executive branch, the FISC, as well as the Congress.166 
 
The current sunset date is for the FAA is December 31, 2017.”167  
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE COLLECTION OF 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
 
In addition to providing a historical overview of the FAA, including 
Section 702, a discussion of the constitutional parameters of United States 
surveillance authorities is necessary to place Section 702 in context.  At the 
outset, and as will be discussed further in Section III.C, it is noted that 
Congress, in passing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its 
subsequent amendments (including the FAA, Section 702), placed constraints 
upon executive branch authorities beyond what is constitutionally 
mandated.168  This article proposes returning some of those authorities back 
to the executive branch.  
As reflected in the previous section, determining where to draw the line 
in regulating the executive branch’s use of surveillance to collect foreign 
intelligence information, i.e., authorization within the executive branch or 
judicial branch, highlights an inherent tension between Article II of the 
United States Constitution and the Fourth Amendment.  On the one hand, 
under Article II, the President is constitutionally mandated to protect the 
                                                
166 FAA Sunsets Extension Act of 2012, S. Rept. 112-174 (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/senate-report/174/1.  
167 FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, House Report 112-645, 2d Session 
Part 2 (2012) https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/house-
report/645/2 (discussing H.R. 5949). 
168 See, e.g., Keith, supra note 30, at 315-16; Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–15. 
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national security interests of the United States.169  On the other hand, the 
Fourth Amendment provides protections from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by our government.170  These two deeply-rooted, and sometime 
competing, interests must be balanced to determine whether surveillance by 
the executive branch is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  To 
understand how these interests are evaluated in the context of the acquisition 
of foreign intelligence information, significant cases addressing this issue will 
be highlighted. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides as 
follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.171 
 
In United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
(Keith), the Supreme Court was presented with the question of weighing 
individual privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment with the President’s 
inherent duty to protect our country under Article II.172  The Supreme Court 
considered whether the President’s authorities, through the Attorney General, 
to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without first 
obtaining a warrant was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.173  To 
determine whether a warrant was required under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Keith Court balanced privacy and free expression with the government’s 
                                                
169 See Keith, supra note 30, at 310. 
170 See discussion about Verdugo–Urquidez, supra note 23. 
171 U.S. Const. amend. IV; see In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1009. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, one must consider: (1) whether there is an exception to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether the search conducted is reasonable. 
172 See Keith, supra note 30, at 299, 324 (“The issue before us  . . . involves the delicate question 
of the President's power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic 
surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval.”).   
173 See Keith, supra note 30, at 299. 
Vol. 7, No. 1   STRENGTHENING SECTION 702                 41 
 
 
responsibility to protect the domestic security of our country.174  The Keith 
Court recognized that “the President of the United States has the 
fundamental duty, under Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, to ‘preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.’”175  After weighing the 
President’s Article II responsibilities with the individual interests of privacy 
and free expression, the Supreme Court concluded that the government must 
obtain a warrant before it conducts surveillance related to the domestic security 
of our country.176  However, the Court left unanswered the question of 
whether a warrant was required for the President to conduct surveillance to 
collect foreign intelligence information in the United States and abroad.177 
While the Supreme Court left open the question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment required a warrant with respect to the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence information,178 federal appellate courts have consistently held 
that, under Article II, the President has inherent authority to conduct 
surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes without 
judicial review.179  A year following the Keith decision, the Third Circuit, in 
United States v. Butenko, considered whether a warrant was required to conduct 
a search solely for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence 
information.180  In this proceeding, the government relied upon the 
                                                
174 See id. at 314–15. 
175 Id. at 310 (quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1). 
176 See id. at 321.  
177 See id. at 308. 
178 See Keith, supra note 30, at 308.  
179 See Bradbury, supra note 33, at 13 n. 31 (citing Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914-15; 
United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 
593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); but see 
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion 
suggesting in dicta that a warrant may be required even in a foreign intelligence investigation)); 
see also In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012 (“a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign 
intelligence for national security purposes and is directed against foreign powers or agents of 
foreign powers reasonably believed to be located outside the United States”); Mohamud, No. 
3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *15 (“[Section] 702 surveillance falls within the foreign 
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.”). 
180 See Butenko, supra note 179, at 596, 605. In Butenko, A. Ivanov, a Soviet national, and John 
Butenko, an American by birth, were convicted of conspiring to transmit or communicate “to a 
foreign government . . . information relating to the national defense” of the United States. In 
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warrantless electronic surveillance of a United States person and a non-United 
States person who were in the United States at the time of the surveillance.181  
Defendants challenged the constitutionality of the warrantless collection.  In 
rejecting the defendants’ claim that the government’s warrantless electronic 
surveillance violated their Fourth Amendment rights, the Third Circuit 
recognized the presidential authority to handle foreign affairs as set forth in 
Article II of the Constitution.182  After balancing the government’s need to 
collect foreign intelligence information with individual privacy rights,183 the 
Butenko Court concluded that a warrantless surveillance did not violate 
defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights because the surveillances was 
reasonable and conducted for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence 
information.184  
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit recognized a foreign intelligence exception 
to the warrant requirement in United States v. Truong Dihn Hung.185  In 
challenging their convictions, the defendants argued that the warrantless 
surveillance conducted by the FBI violated the Fourth Amendment, and as a 
result, the evidence obtained through such surveillance must be suppressed.186  
The Truong Court rejected the defendants’ argument, recognizing a foreign 
intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.  
Specifically, the Court concluded that “because of the need of the executive 
branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional 
                                                
this proceeding, the government relied upon electronic surveillance that it had obtained 
without a warrant. 
181 See id.  
182 See id. at 603 (noting that the authority for the President to conduct electronic surveillance is 
“implied from his duty to conduct the nation's foreign affairs”).  
183 See id. at 596. 
184 See id. at 605–606 (quoting finding of district court judge). 
185 See Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 911–12. Truong Dinh Hung (a Vietnamese citizen 
living in the United States) and Ronald Humphrey (a United States person and an employee of 
the United States Information Agency) were convicted of several espionage-related offenses. 
As part of the investigation, the government conducted electronic surveillance on Truong’s 
telephones and placed a microphone in his apartment without a warrant. Rather, the 
government had received approval of the surveillance from the Attorney General.  
186 See id. 
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competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant 
each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.”187  The Truong court, 
as well as all courts that have considered this issue, have concluded that the 
President has the inherent authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to 
obtain foreign intelligence information.188  
While these decisions recognize the executive branch’s inherent authority 
to conduct warrantless surveillance within the United States to collect foreign 
intelligence information, the search must satisfy the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.189  As the Supreme Court explained 
in United States v. Knights, the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”190  The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review considered the reasonableness requirement in In 
re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.191  In this case, the FISCR reviewed whether the warrantless collection of 
foreign intelligence information of persons overseas under the PAA was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.192  In reaching its decision, the 
FISCR noted that it must weigh national security interests against the Fourth 
                                                
187 Id. at 914–95 (citing Butenko, supra note 179; Brown, supra note 179; United States v. Clay, 430 
F.2d 165 (5 Cir. 1970); contra Zweibon, , supra note 179 (dictum in plurality opinion in case 
involving surveillance of domestic organization having an effect on foreign relations but acting 
neither as the agent of nor in collaboration with a foreign power). 
188 Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91; see In re Sealed Case, supra note 90, at 742 (noting that 
although “the plurality opinion in Zweibon suggested the contrary in dicta, it did not decide the 
issue.”). 
189 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739, 
103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “‘central 
requirement’ is one of reasonableness”).  
190 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
300 (1999)). 
191 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012 ("[W]e must determine whether the protections 
afforded to the privacy rights of targeted persons are reasonable in light of this [national 
security] important interest."); See discussion of In re Directives, supra Part I.C. 
192 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1006. 
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Amendment privacy interests of United States persons.193  After balancing 
these two interests, the FISCR affirmed the FISC’s decision that the search 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.194  
III. CONGRESS SHOULD RESTORE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AUTHORITIES TO 
PERMIT THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OF 
BOTH UNITED STATES AND NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS OVERSEAS 
WITHOUT INDIVIDUALIZED JUDICIAL REVIEW, WITH ADDED PROTECTIONS 
FOR UNITED STATES PERSONS 
 
A. Threat of Americans Joining Terrorist Groups Abroad 
 
With the historical context and the constitutional parameters of Section 
702 in mind, this section contemplates whether certain legal authorities 
should be restored to the executive branch.  Due to the increasing threat of 
Americans joining terrorist organizations around the world,195 this article 
proposes a modification to Section 702 to return certain authorities back to 
the executive branch where they had resided prior to 2008, namely the 
collection of foreign intelligence information on both United States and non-
United States persons overseas without individualized judicial review for each 
collection, with additional safeguards for United States persons.  In 
September 2015, the United States House of Representatives Homeland 
Security Committee released a comprehensive report documenting the 
growing threat to the United States from Americans who assist or join 
terrorist groups abroad.196  The Homeland Security Committee determined 
                                                
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 1007; see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 
157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern 
searches conducted abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.”). 
195 See, e.g., David S. Kris, Trends And Predictions In Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA And 
Beyond, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 3 (2016) at 389 (citing John McLaughlin, The Paris 
Attacks: Former CIA Chief Weighs In, OZY (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.ozy.com/pov/the-
paris-attacks-former-cia-chief-weighs-in/66155) ("By late 2015, ISIL had probably recruited at 
least 4,500 Westerners to its cause, many of them with European passports, and some of 
whom returned to Europe to conduct attacks."). 
196 See HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that in March 
2015, the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee launched a bipartisan 
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that more than 250 Americans thus far have attempted or succeeded in 
traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight with militant groups.197  The Committee 
found that the threat of Americans assisting or joining terrorist overseas 
terrorist organization presents a “serious counterterrorism challenge” for the 
United States.198  With respect Syria, in late 2013, dozens of Americans had 
sought to join Syrian rebels; in July 2014, around 100 had tried to join; and by 
July 2015, more than 250 American sought to join terrorist groups in Syria.199  
As the Homeland Security Committee indicates, “many U.S. suspects 
have tread a common path: espousing their support for ISIS on social media 
and then attempting to leave America, en route to the so-called caliphate.”200  
Once these United States citizens reach Syria or their intended destination, 
they attempt to recruit other Americans to join them.201  Moreover, several 
dozen of these citizens have returned to the United States.202  One of those 
who had returned was arrested for planning a terrorist attack against a United 
States military base.203  The Homeland Security Committee cautioned that the 
“unprecedented speed at which Americans are being radicalized by violent 
extremists is straining federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and 
intercept suspects.”204 
                                                
Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. Eight Members of Congress 
were assigned to examine the threat to the United States from “foreign fighters”—individuals 
who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and join or assist violent extremist 
groups. The Task Force assessed domestic and overseas efforts to obstruct terrorist travel, as 
well as security gaps).  
197 See id. at 15 (citing Barbara Starr, A Few Dozen Americans’ in ISIS Ranks, CNN, July 15, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/isis-american-recruits/).     
198 Id. at 15. 
199 See id. at 16 (citations omitted). 
200 Id. Here, ISIS stands for the Islamic State of Iran and Syria. Other names have been used 
for this terrorist group, including ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) and IS (Islamic State). 
Because the United States House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee refers to 
this terrorist organization as “ISIS,” this terrorist group generally will be referred to as “ISIS” 
throughout this article. See HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2. 
201 See id. 
202 See HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
203 See id. at 8 (citing John Bacon, Ohio Man Accused of Planning U.S. Terror Strike, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 16, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na- tion/2015/04/16/ohio-indicted-
islamic-state-terrorism/25879443/. 
204 Id. at 6; see Jeremy Diamond, Congressional Report: U.S. Has 'Failed' to Stop Flow of Foreign 
Fighters to ISIS, CNN (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/29/politics/foreign-
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Whereas the Homeland Security Committee report focuses on Americans 
joining ISIS, other reports demonstrate that this disquieting phenomenon 
extends beyond Syria and Iraq.  In a February 2015 report, the Anti-
Defamation League reported that a group of Americans who traveled to 
Somalia to fight with Al Shabaab, a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda, 
were described by the FBI as one of the “highest priorities in anti-
terrorism.”205  At least 50 United States citizens and permanent residents are 
thought to have joined, attempted to join, or aided Al Shabaab since 2007.206  
Americans continue to attempt to join this terrorist group.207  The FBI 
believes that these individuals have been recruited by Al Shabaab both on the 
Internet and in person.”208  Furthermore, the FBI is concerned that these 
Americans may return to the United States and attempt to commit terrorist 
acts in our country.209  
                                                
fighters-isis-congressional-task-force-report/ ("The U.S. is losing the battle to stop Americans 
from traveling abroad to enlist in ISIS, a bipartisan congressional task force concluded in a 
report released Tuesday."); Ed Payne, More Americans volunteering to help ISIS, CNN (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/us/isis-us-arrests/ (providing an overview of 
individual accounts of United States persons attempting to join or joining ISIS). For example, 
Abdi Nur, after leaving Minnesota for Syria in 2014, “spent months persuading his friends in 
Minneapolis to join him. His peer-to-peer recruiting nearly worked, as six of his friends 
attempted to leave the United States for Syria.” HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 16 (citing Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz, ISIS Arrests Highlight Role of 
American Recruiter, CNN (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/politics/isis-
minnesota-arrests-abdi-nur/); see Andrew Grossman, Ben Kesling, and Tamara Audi, Federal 
Authorities Arrest Six Men in Minneapolis and San Diego on Charges Related to a Terrorism Investigation, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/terrorism-probe-yields-six-arrests-u-
s-authorities-say-1429518994 (“Six Minnesota men were charged Monday in connection with 
attempts to join Islamic State, following a 10-month investigation into a network of young 
Somali-Americans that authorities say underscores the power of Westerners who have traveled 
overseas to recruit friends back home to join extremist groups.”). As another example, “Ohio 
suspect Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud was urged by his brother Aden to join him overseas.” 
HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16 (citing Columbus, Ohio, Man 
Charged with Providing Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/columbus-ohio-man-
charged- providing-material-support-terrorists). Mohamud “agreed to join him and left the 
United States for Syria, though his brother was later killed in the fighting.” 
205 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE REPORT, AL SHABAAB’S AMERICAN RECRUITS, supra note 2, at 
1.  
206 See id.  
207 See id.  
208 Id.  
209 See id. One of these recruits, 22-year-old Abidsalan Hussein Ali from Minneapolis, “was one 
of two suicide bombers who attacked African Union troops on October 29, 2011.” Ali is the 
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While Americans leaving the United States to join terrorist organizations 
increased through mid-2015, within the last year, the number of Americans 
traveling abroad to join terrorist groups has declined.210  Despite this decline, 
James Comey, Director, FBI, noted that ISIS is "still attracting 'troubled souls' 
through social media who pose potential terror threats, resulting in more than 
1,000 active FBI investigations into online recruitment — a slight increase 
from over a year ago."211  He also noted that the FBI was still deeply 
concerned about the threat of foreign fighters returning to either the United 
States or to western Europe.212  Likewise, Matt Olsen recognized that the 
number of Americans and citizens of “visa waiver” countries in Europe who 
have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight “raises the real danger that these 
individuals could be deployed here to conduct attacks similar to the attacks in 
Paris and Brussels.”213  Mr. Olsen noted that ISIS continues to “target 
Americans for recruitment, including through the use of focused social media, 
in order to identify and mobilize operatives here.”214  
B. Proposed Modification to Section 702 
 
Based upon these events, and with the increasing globalization of terrorist 
organizations and their sophisticated ability to recruit new members, 
Congress should consider enhanced surveillance tools, within constitutional 
limits, that might help the United States anticipate future terrorist threats.  
Any revisions to the surveillance authorities must include appropriate 
                                                
“third American Al Shabaab suicide bomber.” The first, Shirwa Ahmed, “carried out a suicide 
bombing at the Ethiopian Consulate and the presidential palace in Hargeisa killing 24 people in 
October 2009.” The second, Farah Mohamad Beledi, “carried out a suicide bombing on May 
30, 2011, targeting a military base outside Mogadishu, the Somali capital, killing two African 
Union peacekeepers and a Somali soldier.” Further, “Al Shabaab claimed that three Americans 
took part in its assault on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on September 21, 2013.” 
210 See Michael Isikoff, Steep Decline in U.S. Recruits To ISIS, FBI Chief James Comey Says, YAHOO! 
NEWS (May 11, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/steep-decline-in-us-recruits-to-isis-fbi-
chief-212138680.html.  
211 Id. (citing to comments by James Comey). 
212 See id. 
213 Stmt. of Olsen, supra note 2, at 3. 
214 See id. 
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safeguards for United States person privacy interests. As such, this article 
proposes that Section 702 should be strengthened to authorize the collection 
of foreign intelligence information on both United States and non-United 
States persons overseas without individualized judicial review, subject to 
additional judicial oversight for United States persons.  In setting forth this 
proposed change, the following concepts are highlighted: 
 
1. Under Article II, the President has a duty to protect the 
United States.215  The Fourth Amendment provides 
protections to United States persons, and persons in the 
United States who have developed substantial connections 
with this country, from unreasonable searches and seizures 
by our government.216  These two fundamental interests 
must be balanced to determine whether surveillance without 
individualized judicial review is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
2. The President has the constitutional authority to collect 
foreign intelligence information without first seeking judicial 
approval, e.g., foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Clause.  If a person is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, the surveillance of that persons must 
meet the reasonableness requirement.217 
 
3. As originally enacted, FISA only governed the collection of 
foreign intelligence information inside of the United States.  
FISA did not govern international calls or electronic 
communications of United States persons abroad.218 
 
4. With evolving technologies, more communications fell 
within the scope of FISA; this development resulted in the 
need to seek FISC approval to acquire such communications 
where previously such judicial review had not been required.  
 
                                                
215 U.S. Const. art. II; see Keith, supra note 30, at 315–16; Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 
914–15. 
216 U.S. Const. IV amend; see Verdugo-Urquidez, supra note 23, at 270–71 (citing Plyler, supra note 
23, at 212).   
217 See Keith, supra note 30, at 315–16; Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–15. 
218 See Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless 
Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 20 (2006) 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf. 
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5. The attacks of September 11, 2001 precipitated a recognition 
of the need for the intelligence community to conduct 
surveillance of international communications and oversea 
targets at a much greater speed and with increased 
flexibility.219  Seeking individual FISC orders for 
international and oversea communications under the 
outdated version of FISA no longer proved feasible.220 
 
6. The 2007 PAA permitted the warrantless collection of 
foreign intelligence information of both United States and 
non-United States persons outside of the United States.221  
The FISCR concluded that the warrantless acquisition of 
foreign intelligence information under the PAA was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.222 
 
7. The 2008 FAA, for the first time, requires the executive 
branch to obtain individual FISC approval each time it seeks 
to acquire foreign intelligence information of United States 
persons outside of the United States. The process of 
preparing FISA applications and presenting them to the 
FISC is “substantial” 223 and is beyond what is 
constitutionally mandated.224 
 
8. The FAA mandates extensive safeguards and oversight 
provisions to protect the privacy interests of United States 
persons, including minimization procedures, targeting 
procedures, mandatory reviews, and mandatory reports to 
the FISC and Congress.  In addition, oversight of the 
implementation of Section 702 includes compliance with 
FISC Rules of Procedure, the PCLOB review, and 
requirements of Executive Order 13462, as amended.  
Reviews have uniformly determined that the executive 
branch has not intentionally misused any of its authorities 
under Section 702.225  
                                                
219 See Open Hearing on Legislative Proposals for Modifying NSA Programs and Amending FISA 
Authorities: Open Hearing before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) 
(testimony of Steven Bradbury, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the United 
States Dept. of Justice), 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/bradbury1029201
3.pdf. 
220 See id. 
221 See Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 81. 
222 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1016.  
223 See, e.g., Cordero, supra note 49. 
224 See Keith, supra note 30, at 315–16; see also Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–15. 
225 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
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9. With the increasing globalization of terrorist organizations 
and their sophisticated ability to recruit new members, the 
United States must anticipate future threats and ensure that 
our country has the necessary legal authorities to counter 
them, including the ability to act with speed and agility in the 
collection of foreign intelligence information.  The 
Homeland Security Committee cautioned that the 
“unprecedented speed at which Americans are being 
radicalized by violent extremists is straining federal law 
enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects.”226 
 
In light of these guiding principles, Section 702 should be strengthened to 
permit the collection of foreign intelligence information of both United States 
and non-United States persons abroad without seeking individualized judicial 
review.  Returning these authorities to the executive branch will provide it 
with the essential flexibility that it needs to collect foreign intelligence 
information on terrorist groups overseas, including United States persons 
who join them.  While individualized judicial approval would not be required, 
the acquisition would be subject to the statutory protections of Section 702. 
For example, the government must comply with FISC-approved targeting and 
minimization procedures pertaining to United States person information.227  
Further, the extensive oversight provisions would apply to this collection, 
such as congressionally mandated reports and audits.228  
In addition to the statutory requirements and oversight mechanisms 
pursuant to the FAA, collection of United States person information would 
be subject to the requirements set forth in Executive Order 12333, as 
amended, section 2.5, which provides: 
Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated 
the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the 
                                                
226 HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
227 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2015); see also 50 U.S.C.S. § 1881(a)(c)(1), (d)(1); see also Benjamin 
Wittes, The Minimization and Targeting Procedures: An Analysis, LAWFARE (June 23, 2013, 4:19 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/minimization-and-targeting-procedures-analysis. 
228 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12333, as amended, supra note 106; Exec. Order No. 13462, as 
amended, supra note 154; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881(a)(l)(1)–(l)(3), 1881(f); PCLOB SECTION 702, supra 
note 11. 
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United States or against a United States person abroad, of any 
technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for 
law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not 
be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each 
case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is 
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.229 
 
The proposed modifications to the FAA would no longer mandate 
individualized findings of probable cause by the FISC to conduct surveillance 
of a United States person abroad.  Rather, under the proposed statutory 
structure, the authority to determine probable cause to conduct surveillance 
of United States persons overseas would reside within the executive branch.  
Under the recommended framework, pursuant to Executive Order 12333, 
Section 2.5, before collecting foreign intelligence information on a United 
States person overseas, the Attorney General must make a probable cause 
finding that surveillance is conducted “against a foreign power or an agent of 
a foreign power.”230  In other words, the Attorney General would determine 
probable cause—rather than the FISC—that surveillance is conducted 
“against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”  As such, the 
authority for deciding probable cause would return to the executive branch 
where it had resided before the enactment of the FAA in 2008.231  
To ensure that United States persons’ privacy interests are protected 
under the proposed framework, in addition to the protections currently 
mandated by Section 702, this article proposes one more: the FISC should 
conduct oversight of the AG’s probable cause findings under Executive 
Order 12333 Section 2.5 with respect to United States persons.232  This 
                                                
229 EO 12333, Section 2.5, supra note 106 (providing that the authority delegated to the 
Attorney General, including “the authority to approve the use of electronic surveillance as 
defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, shall be exercised in 
accordance with that Act”). 
230 Id.; see supra note 161 for definition of “agent of a foreign power” under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).  
231 See In re Directives, supra note 82. 
232 Thank you to Judge James Baker and Professor William Buzbee for their suggestion of 
additional oversight of the AG’s probable cause findings under EO 12333 Section 2.5 with 
respect to United State persons.  
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judicial oversight is critical to the proposed changes to Section 702.  While 
returning the authority to conduct surveillance of United States persons 
overseas to the executive branch, the judicial branch would provide oversight 
of these executive branch decisions.  Such oversight could be conducted as 
part of the FISC’s review of the government’s certification requests that are 
submitted to the court on an annual basis.  To accomplish this oversight, 
language should be added to the FAA requiring that the Attorney General, as 
part of the annual certification process, provide the FISC with a report 
documenting the number of AG probable cause determinations for United 
States persons that were authorized pursuant to Executive Order 12333, 
Section 2.5, and a description of the basis for each determination.  The FISC 
would then be required to review these AG probable cause determinations to 
ensure that they are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and Executive 
Order 12333, Section 2.5. 
Based upon the above discussion, the proposed modifications to the 
FAA include:  
• Delete the words “other than United States persons” from 
the language in the title of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (§ 702).233 
 
• Repeal 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(3).234 
 
• Repeal 50 U.S.C. § 1881b (§ 703), Certain acquisitions inside the 
United States targeting United States person outside the United 
States.235  
 
• Repeal 50 U.S.C. § 1881c (§ 704), Other acquisitions targeting 
United States person outside the United States.236  
                                                
233 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a). 
234 See id. § 1881(a)(b)(3) (prohibiting the intentional targeting of a “United States person 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States”). 
235 See id. § 1881(b)(c) (requiring FISC must make a probable cause finding that the United 
States person is: (1) “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;” and (2) “a 
foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power” as 
defined in FISA). 
236 See id. § 1881(c)(c) (stating that FISC must make a probable cause finding that the United 
States person is (1) “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;” and (2) “a 
foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power”). 
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• Repeal 50 U.S.C. § 1881d (§ 705), Joint applications and 
concurrent authorizations.237 
 
• Repeal 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881f(b)(2) and 1881f(b)(3), Congressional 
oversight.238 
 
•  Add language mandating FISC review of the AG probable 
cause determinations pursuant to Executive Order 12333, 
Section 2.5, as part of the annual certification process. For 
example: 
 
o Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2), Certification 
Requirements, add a requirement that the Attorney 
General, as part of the annual certification review, 
provide the FISC with a report documenting the 
number of AG probable cause determinations made 
to authorize surveillance on United States persons 
pursuant to Executive Order 12333, Section 2.5, and 
a description of the basis for each such 
determination, including facts establishing probable 
cause that the technique is directed against a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.  
 
o Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i), Judicial review of 
certification and procedures, add language requiring FISC 
assessment of whether such AG probable cause 
determinations are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment and Executive Order 12333, Section 
2.5.239   
 
                                                
237 See id. § 1881(d)(a) (“[i]f an acquisition targeting a United States person under section 
1881(b) or 1881(c) of this title is proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United 
States, a judge having jurisdiction under section 1881(b)(a)(1) or 1881(c)(a)(1) of this title may 
issue simultaneously, upon the request of the Government in a joint application complying 
with the requirements of sections 1881b(b) and 1881c(b) of this title, orders under sections 
1881b(c) and 1881c(c) of this title, as appropriate.”). 
238 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881(f)(b)(2), (3) (requiring reports to Congress for surveillance conducted 
under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881(b) and 1881(c) containing the total number of applications made for 
orders, the total number of such orders, the total number of emergency acquisitions authorized 
by the Attorney General, and the total number of subsequent orders approving or denying 
such applications). 
239 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(i). The current statute states that a FISC shall review a certification 
submitted by the Attorney General or Director of National Intelligence to assure it meets the 
required targeting and minimization procedures.  
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Pursuant to this proposed framework, the executive branch would have 
the flexibility to quickly begin surveillance on United States persons outside 
of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that such person 
is acting as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.  Importantly, the 
executive branch’s probable cause determinations would be subject to judicial 
oversight to ensure adherence to the Fourth Amendment and the standards 
set forth in Executive Order 12333, Section 2.5.  
 
C. The Proposed Modifications to Section 702 Comply with the Fourth Amendment 
 
Fundamentally, while the proposed modifications to Section 702 will 
provide the executive branch with stronger surveillance tools and greater 
flexibility to protect our national security interests, such modifications must 
comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  For United States persons, who are afforded Fourth 
Amendment protections both inside and outside of the United States, the 
collection of this information must be consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.240  Currently, Section 702 places statutory constraints upon the 
executive branch beyond what is constitutionally mandated.241  Under the 
Fourth Amendment, two issues must be considered: (1) whether the search 
conducted under the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant; and (2) whether 
the search conducted under the Fourth Amendment is reasonable.242  As 
                                                
240 See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, supra note 23, at 270–71; Keith, supra note 30, at 315–16; United 
States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, supra note 23, at 
1234 (Wallace, J., dissenting)) (discussing that the term "People of the United States" includes 
"American citizens at home and abroad"); Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914-15; United 
States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 284–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
241 See Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–15; see also Butenko,  supra note 179, at 605 
(holding that the President has the constitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence 
information without first seeking judicial approval under the foreign intelligence exception to 
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause); see also Keith, supra note 30 (holding that the 
government must obtain a warrant before it conducts surveillance related to the domestic 
security of our country, but leaving unanswered the question of whether a warrant was required 
for the President to conduct surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information in the 
United States and abroad). 
242 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012. 
Vol. 7, No. 1   STRENGTHENING SECTION 702                 55 
 
 
discussed in Section II, courts recognize a foreign intelligence exception to 
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.243  Because courts recognize a 
foreign intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause, the next issue to be 
considered is whether the proposed changes to Section 702 meet the 
reasonableness requirement.  In In re Directives, the FISCR considered whether 
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under the PAA (which 
permitted overseas collection of foreign intelligence information of both 
United States and non-United States persons) was reasonable.244  In doing so, 
the FISCR, applying Supreme Court precedent, employed a “totality of the 
circumstances” test, balancing individual privacy interests with the 
governmental interest at stake.245  The FISCR recognized that “the relevant 
governmental interest—the interest in national security—is of the highest 
order of magnitude.”246  The court continued that it must consider whether 
the privacy interests of targeted person are reasonable in light of the strong 
national security interests.247  
The court, employing the totality of the circumstances test, considered 
several factors to determine whether the privacy protections in the PAA and 
those required under the certifications and directives established 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.248  Applying a totality of the 
                                                
243 See, e.g., Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–15; Buck, supra note 179, at 875; Butenko,  
supra note 179, at 605; In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012; Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-
1, supra note 155, at *15. 
244 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012. 
245 Id. (citing Samson, supra note 89, at 848; Gardner, supra note 89, at  8–9)); see Mohamud, No. 14-
30217, supra note 155 at *18 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (in 
deciding reasonableness, the Ninth Circuit examined the totality of the circumstances and 
weighed “‘the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the 
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy’”); see also Donohue, supra note 19, at 252-63, for a 
thorough discussion about the reasonable standard as it relates to the collection of information 
pursuant to Section 702.  
246 In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012 (citing Agee, supra note 90, at 307; In re Sealed Case, supra 
note 90, at 746). 
247 See id. at 1013.   
248 Id. The factors that the FISCR balanced to make this determination included: (1) targeting 
procedures, (2) minimization procedures, and (3) procedures to ensure that a “significant 
purpose of a surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,” (4) procedures 
incorporated through Executive Order 12333, section 2.5, and (5) procedures outlined “in an 
affidavit supporting the certifications.” 
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circumstances test to the proposed modification to Section 702, four of the 
factors set forth in In re Directives will be considered, including (1) targeting 
procedures, (2) minimization procedures, (3) procedures to ensure that a 
“significant purpose of a surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence,” and (4) 
compliance with Executive Order 12333, section 2.5.249  In addition to these 
four issues, the extensive oversight of the implementation of Section 702 is 
considered.  
Under the “totality circumstances” test set forth in In re Directives, the 
proposed changes to the FAA satisfy the reasonableness standard under the 
Fourth Amendment.  First, prior to collecting information under Section 702, 
the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence must submit a 
written certification to the FISC attesting that a significant purpose of the 
collection is to acquire foreign intelligence information.250  Second, the 
proposed modification to Section 702 will be subject to minimization 
procedures to protect United States persons’ information.251  Third, targeting 
procedures will ensure that the collection is directed at persons located 
outside of the United States.252  The fourth factor to consider is compliance 
with Executive Order 12333, as amended, section 2.5.253  While the proposed 
modifications to the FAA would no longer mandate an individualized finding 
                                                
249 Id. at 1012. 
250 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(g) (emphasis added). The government cannot target anyone under 
the court-approved procedures for Section 702 collection “unless there is an appropriate, and 
documented, foreign intelligence purpose for the acquisition.”  
251 As discussed in section I.D.1, minimization procedures, which play an integral role in 
protecting privacy interests of United States persons, are statutorily required procedures that 
are designed to ensure that United States personal information is protected. 50 U.S.C. § 
1801(h) states that minimization procedures are “reasonably designed in light of the purpose 
and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and 
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see FBI, CIA, AND NSA 
SECTION 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17. 
252 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(d)(1). Under the proposed Section 702, the targeting procedures would 
follow the language in 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(d)(1) to ensure that acquisition “is limited to 
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” and to “prevent 
the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended 
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”  
253 See Executive Order No. 12333, supra note 106. 
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of probable cause by the FISC to conduct surveillance of a United States 
person abroad, pursuant to Executive Order 12333, the Attorney General 
must determine that there is probable cause to believe that surveillance is 
conducted against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.254  Under 
the proposed framework, the FISC would conduct oversight of the AG’s 
probable cause findings with respect to United States persons overseas to 
ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and Executive Order 12333.  
Finally, in evaluating the reasonableness of the proposed changes, the 
oversight requirements must be considered.  Oversight of Section 702 is 
conducted by all three branches of our government.255  These oversight 
regimes ensure that the executive branch complies with the Fourth 
Amendment, statutory requirements, minimization procedures, and targeting 
procedures.  For example, the FISC engages in a comprehensive review of 
submitted certifications.256  As more FISC opinions are publicly released, one 
can see the careful analysis that goes into deciding complex issues that arise 
                                                
254 See id. 
255 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12333, supra note 106; Exec. Order No. 13462, supra note 154, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1881(a)(l)(1)–(3); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(f); PCLOB SECTION 702, supra note 11; FISC 
RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 152. 
256 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(i)(3)(A), (B). Targeting and minimization procedures must also be 
submitted to the FISC to determine whether they are consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
and meet the statutory requirements. If the FISC determines that these criteria are met, it may 
approve the certification and the use of the procedures for acquisition. If the FISC determines 
that these requirements have not been met, the FISC will order the government to “correct any 
deficiency identified by the Court” or “cease, or not begin, the implementation of the 
authorization for which such certification was submitted.” Contrary to a belief that the FISC is 
merely a “rubber stamp” for the executive branch’s requests, this is not the case. Letter from 
Reggie B. Walton, Presiding J., U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., to the Hon. Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (July 29, 2013), 
http://fas.org/irp/news/2013/07/fisc-leahy.pdf (explaining that FISC is not a “rubber stamp” 
court). Judge Walton explained that the FISC’s approval rate of applications “reflect only the 
number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not 
reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final submission or even withheld 
from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them.” 
Id. at 3. As further explained by Judge Walton, “Notably, the approval rating for Title III 
wiretap applications . . . is higher than the approval rate for FISA applications, even using the 
Attorney General’s FISA statistics as the baseline for comparison, as recent statistics show that 
from 2008 through 2012, only five of 13,593 Title III wiretap applications were requested but 
not authorized.” Id. at 3 n. 6. 
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before the FISC.257  As another example, at least every six months the 
Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence must submit a report 
to the FISC and Congress assessing compliance with the targeting and 
minimization procedures.258  In recent semiannual reports that were 
submitted to the FISC and Congress, and are now publicly released, the AG 
and DNI indicated that the NSA, FBI, and CIA implemented targeting and 
minimization procedures “in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted 
effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 
702.”259  Likewise, the PCLOB conducted a thorough review of the use of 
Section 702 and “found no evidence of intentional abuse.”260 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, applying the factors 
discussed above, one can conclude that the proposed modifications to 
Section 702 are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.261  As recognized 
by the FISCR, combatting terrorism and collecting foreign intelligence 
information to counter threats to the United States are “of the highest order 
of magnitude.”262  The FISCR has noted that “there is a high degree of 
probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the government's ability to 
collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede the vital national 
                                                
257 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, supra note 90; In re Directives, supra note 82; Redacted, 2011 WL 
10945618, supra note 18; Redacted, 2011 WL 10947772, supra note 18; FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT, PUBLIC FILINGS, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/public-filings (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2016); Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Release of Three Opinions Issued by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, IC ON THE RECORD (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/143070924983/release-of-three-opinions-issued-by-
the-foreign. The June 2015 revisions to FISA under the USA FREEDOM Act likely will lead 
to greater transparency of the FISC’s proceedings. Under the USA FREEDOM Act, the 
government must make “publicly available to the greatest extent practicable” each FISC or 
FISCR decision “that includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of 
law.” 50 U.S.C.S. § 1872 (LexisNexis PL 114-29, approved Sept. 30, 2016). 
258 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(l)(1) (2012) (reports to Congress must be submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate). 
259 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17.  
260 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. 
261 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012. 
262 Id. (citing Agee, supra note 90, at 307). 
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security interests that are at stake.”263  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit recognized 
efforts to “counter foreign threats to the national security require the 
utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy.”264  The proposed modifications would 
strengthen United States surveillance authorities by providing the executive 
branch with the flexibility and speed that it needs to help protect the 
American public and our national security interests.265   
In view of these compelling national security interests, the question then 
turns to whether privacy protections of targeted persons are reasonable.266  
Under the proposed framework, and as mandated by FISA, Executive Order 
12333, and targeting and minimization procedures, United States person 
privacy interests are protected at all stages of the process, from collecting 
foreign intelligence information through using and disseminating such 
information.  Moreover, statutorily mandated oversight of the modified 
Section 702 program would be conducted by all three branches of the 
government, ensuring that United States persons privacy interests are 
protected.  Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, the proposed 
changes to the FAA would satisfy the reasonableness standard under the 
Fourth Amendment.267  
 
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LIMIT THE ABILITY TO QUERY INFORMATION 
COLLECTED UNDER SECTION 702 
 
In a recent article, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, The 
FAA and Beyond, David S. Kris, General Counsel of Intellectual Ventures, and 
former Assistant Attorney General for the United States Department of 
                                                
263 Id. at 1011 (citing Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 915) (“explaining that when the object 
of a surveillance is a foreign power or its collaborators, ‘the government has the greatest need 
for speed, stealth, and secrecy’”). 
264 Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 915. 
265 See 154 CONG. REC. S6118 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Bond), 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2008/06/25/CREC-2008-06-25.pdf. Section 702’s “more 
agile targeting requirements” provide the Intelligence Community with the “ability to acquire 
important foreign intelligence information in a timely manner.”  
266 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012. 
267 See id. at 1012 (citing Samson, supra note 89, at 848; Gardner, supra note 89, 8–9).  
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Justice, National Security Division, predicts that the querying of information 
obtained under Section 702 with United States person identifiers will be one 
of the six issues most likely to be addressed while considering the 
reenactment of Section 702.268  In fact, recently both Congress and scholars 
have proposed limitations to querying foreign intelligence information 
collected under Section 702.269  This article maintains that adding statutory 
limitations to querying lawfully collected Section 702 information would 
create unnecessary obstacles in an area where no fix is needed.  
As explained below, courts consistently have determined that the current 
procedures for querying Section 702 data comply with the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.270  Further, protections exist for the querying of 
Section 702 data and the executive branch has a record of complying with 
                                                
268 See Kris, supra note 195, at 377–78. In his article, Kris predicts that there will be six major 
themes that "dominate" congressional debate in reenacting Section 702.  Kris predicts the 
following issues will play a major role when Congress debates the reenactment of Section 702:  
[1] the "upstream" collection of communications about non-U.S. persons located 
abroad (less than 10 percent of FAA collection, and probably unavoidable for 
technical reasons); [2] U.S. person queries of FAA data (fewer than 200 conducted 
by NSA in 2013, more by other agencies); [3] statutorily required or forbidden 
sharing of raw FAA data with foreign partners (now dealt with through FISA Court-
approved minimization procedures); [4] the authorized purposes of FAA collection 
(likely not to affect existing collection very much); [5] NSA compliance issues 
(already well publicized, dealt with by the court and congressional oversight, and 
unlikely to result in significant FAA amendments, but perhaps significant for the 
long run as the intelligence community moves data to the cloud); . . . [and 6] 
surveillance under Executive Order 12333, which is very likely to arise in connection 
with FAA renewal but is difficult to discuss at present because it is the subject of a 
forthcoming report from the PCLOB. 
269 See id. at 18–19 (citing Charlie Savage, Statement at The Second Annual Cato Surveillance 
Conference, After FREEDOM: A Dialogue on NSA in the Post-Snowden Era, NEW YORK TIMES, 
(Oct. 21. 2015)).  
270 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 44-45 (the FISC concluded that querying provisions set 
forth in the minimization procedures comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
because they “strike a reasonable balance between the privacy interests of United States 
persons and persons in the United States, on the one hand, and the government’s national 
security interests, on the other”); see also Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at 
*26 (holding that querying of collected information is not a separate search and does not make 
surveillance conducted under Section 702 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see also 
Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *12 N. 20 (determining that it would be inconsistent to permit the 
government to review information in its possession, but prohibit queries of the same 
information). 
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these procedural safeguards.271  The procedures for querying lawfully 
collected Section 702 information are found in FBI, NSA, and CIA 
minimization procedures which restrict what type of queries may be 
conducted.272  For example, CIA Minimization Procedures state that its 
“queries must be reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information.”273  Similarly, NSA Minimization Procedures require that queries 
be limited to “selection terms reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information.”274  The FBI Minimization Procedures provide that queries must 
be designed “to find, extract, review, translate, and assess whether such 
[FISA-acquired] information reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence 
information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or 
assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime.”275  
 
A. Recent Court Decisions Discussing Querying of Section 702 Information 
 
In a November 2015 decision, the FISC considered whether the 
procedures for querying information collected under section 702, especially 
queries that were designed to return information concerning United States 
persons, were consistent with the Fourth Amendment and Section 702.276  
The FISC appointed an amicus curiae, Amy Jeffress, to address these issues 
through written and oral argument. 277  Ms. Jeffress focused on the FBI 
Minimization Procedures, and maintained that they “‘go far beyond the 
                                                
271 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17 (March 2014 at 
8–11; Oct. 2014 at 8–10; June 2015 at 8–11; Sept. 2015 at 8-12; Feb. 2016 at 8–13; Nov. 2016 
at 8–12) (noting that as part of its reviews, DOJ and ODNI review the querying of 
unminimized Section 702-acquired communications using United States person identifiers). 
272 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6; Kris, supra 
note 195, at 395–96 n. 66. 
273 CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 3.  
274 NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 7. 
275  FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 11. 
276 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 6 (citing NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 
17, at 7; FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 11-12; CIA MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 3-4) (This opinion was publicly released by the DNI on April 
19, 2016). 
277 Ms. Jeffress was appointed pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(2)(B).  
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purpose for which the Section 702-acquired information is collected in 
permitting queries that are unrelated to national security.’”278  The FISC 
disagreed with Ms. Jeffress’ legal assertion.279  
As explained by the court, FISA does not require that acquisitions under 
Section 702 be conducted solely for a foreign intelligence purpose.280  Rather, 
an acquisition under Section 702 is permitted if the foreign intelligence 
purpose for the collection is only a significant purpose, and not the primary 
purpose, of the acquisition.281  NSA’s targeting procedures ensure that a 
significant purpose of each Section 702 targeting decision is for the 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information.282  Moreover, FISA 
contemplates that the collection of information under Section 702 may be 
used in criminal proceedings.283  For example, FISA explicitly mandates that 
the government develop procedures pertaining to the retention and 
dissemination of Section 702-acquired information that is evidence of a crime 
for law enforcement purposes.284  As another safeguard, the FISC noted that 
the FBI Minimization Procedures place considerable limitations on the use 
and dissemination of information obtained from queries.285  Based upon these 
                                                
278 Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 30 (quoting Amicus Br. for the Ct. at 19).   
279 See id. at 30–45. 
280 See id. at 31. 
281 See id. (citing In re Sealed Case, supra note 90, at 734 (pursuant to the “‘significant purpose’ 
standard, an acquisition under Section 702 is permissible ‘even if ‘foreign intelligence’ is only a 
significant—not a primary—purpose’ of the targeting decision.”)). 
282 See id. 
283 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 32; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (providing in pertinent 
part that minimization procedures with respect to electronic surveillance include "procedures 
that allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which 
has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for 
law enforcement purposes"). 
284 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 32. FISA does not “foreclose any examination or use of 
information acquired pursuant to Section 702 that lacks a purpose relating to foreign 
intelligence.” The FISC pointed out that FISA requires that minimization procedures “‘allow 
for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime.’”  
285 Id. at 35. Further, as noted by David Kris, NSA’s 2014 minimization procedures do not 
permit the “querying upstream (rather than downstream) data with U.S. person identifiers,” 
and “neither the FBI nor the CIA has access to un-minimized upstream data.” Kris, supra note 
195, at 396 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
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considerations, the FISC concluded that the NSA, FBI, and CIA 
Minimization Procedures, including the querying provisions, comply with the 
statutory requirements. 
The FISC also evaluated whether NSA, FBI, and CIA Minimization and 
Procedures were consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
The FISC primarily focused its analysis on the FBI’s minimization 
procedures.  The FISC concluded that the minimization procedures, including 
the querying procedures, complied with Fourth Amendment mandates. In 
reaching this decision, the FISC explained: 
[T]he purpose of permitting queries designed to elicit evidence of 
ordinary crimes is not entirely unconnected to foreign intelligence.  
Such queries are permitted in part to ensure that the FBI does not fail 
to identify the foreign-intelligence significance of information in its 
possession.  One of the main criticisms of the government following 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, was its failure to identify and 
appropriately distribute information in its possession that could have 
been used to disrupt the plot.286 
 
The FISC reiterated that the FBI Minimization Procedures place 
considerable restrictions on the use and dissemination of information derived 
from queries.287  The FISC further noted that the FBI queries only a subset of 
the information that is collected by the government under Section 702.288  For 
example, the FBI does not receive any unminimized information acquired 
through NSA’s upstream collection under Section 702.289  The Court also 
noted that FBI queries designed to obtain evidence of crimes unrelated to 
foreign intelligence “rarely, if ever,” generate responsive results from data 
collected under Section 702.290  Based upon these considerations, the FISC 
                                                
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2014), § 3(b)(5), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/2014%20NSA%20702%20Minimization%20Pro
cedures.pdf; PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 7, 35, 161 n.571 (“Data from 
upstream collection is received only by the NSA: neither the CIA nor the FBI has access to 
unminimized upstream data”). 
286 Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 42. 
287 See id.  
288 Id. at 43. 
289 See Id. (the “FBI acquires only a ‘small portion’ of the unminimized Section 702 collection”). 
290 Id. at 44 (citing PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 59–60). 
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determined that the querying provisions of the FBI Minimization Procedures 
achieve a reasonable balance between the privacy interests of United States 
persons and the national security interests of our country.291  Accordingly, the 
FISC concluded that the minimization procedures, including the querying 
provisions, comply with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.292  
Similar to the findings of the FISC, in United States v. Mohamud, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Oregon recognized that “[S]ubsequent 
querying of a § 702 collection, even if U.S. person identifiers are used, is not a 
separate search and does not make § 702 surveillance unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.”293  Likewise, in United States v. Hasbajrami, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that it would be 
inconsistent to permit the government to review information in its 
possession, but prohibit queries of the same information.294  Specifically, the 
Hasbajrami Court wrote: “[i]t would be perverse to authorize the unrestricted 
review of lawfully collected information but then restrict the targeted review 
of the same information in response to tailored inquiries.”295  
 
B. Recent Congressional Activity Regarding the Querying of Section 702 Information 
 
In 2014, 2015, and 2016, legislation was introduced in Congress to limit 
the FBI, CIA, and NSA’s ability to query information collected pursuant to 
Section 702.296  Most recently, in June 2016, Representatives Thomas Massie 
                                                
291 Id. 
292 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 44–45.  
293 Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *26 (emphasis added). While the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the Mohamud decision on appeal, the appellate court did not consider 
the issue of whether the querying of incidentally-collected communications was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. Mohamud, No. 14-30217, supra note 155, at *15 (holding that 
because “no retention and querying of the incidentally-collected communications is at issue in 
this case, an argument regarding reasonableness was outside the scope of this court’s review”). 
294 See Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *12 n. 20.  
295 Id. (quoting Gov't Br. at 71–72). 
296 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 321, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (June 16, 2016), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll321.xml (showing 
that the Massie Amendment recently was defeated in a 222-198 vote); Steven Nelson, House 
Rejects NSA Reforms After Orlando Massacre Mass Murderer Omar Mateen Claims Another Victim: A 
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and Zoe Lofgren introduced legislation (Massie Amendment) that would 
prohibit the appropriations of funds to query foreign intelligence information 
collected under Section 702 using a United States person identifier.297  
Representative Massie stated that he introduced the legislation to ensure that 
querying Section 702 information complies with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.298  He believed that probable cause and a warrant were 
required before the government could query information legally obtained and 
in its possession.299  Similarly, Representative Lofgren advocated that the 
government should be prohibited from querying its databases for information 
concerning United States citizens without a warrant.300 
In opposition to the Massie Amendment, Representative Christopher 
Stewart urged that the amendment be defeated, noting that Congress “should 
be focusing on thwarting terror attacks, not on thwarting the ability of 
intelligence professionals to investigate and to stop them.”301  Representative 
Rodney Frelinghuysen echoed these concerns, stating that the amendment 
would restrict the intelligence community's ability “to protect our national 
security and create an impediment to the government's ability to locate threat 
information already in its possession.”302  Representative Frelinghuysen 
further noted that “Lawful queries can enable analysts to identify potential 
terror plots, to identify foreign nations trying to hack into our networks, to 
locate foreign intelligence officers spying within our borders.”303  
                                                
Once-Popular Push for Privacy Protections Against 'Backdoor' Surveillance, U.S. NEWS, (June 16, 2016),  
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-16/house-rejects-nsa-reforms-after-orlando-
massacre (finding that in 2015, "the House passed the measure in a 255-174 vote after an even 
more lopsided 293-123 victory in 2014. After both votes, the amendment was not considered 
by the Senate and was axed in budget deals brokered by more hawkish congressional leaders").  
297 See Amendment to H.R. 5293, as Reported Offered by Mr. Massie of Kentucky, 
https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/massie_041_xml.pdf. 
298 See 162 CONG. REC. H3894 (daily ed. June 15, 2016) (statement of Representative Massie), 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2016/06/15/CREC-2016-06-15-pt1-PgH3892-2.pdf. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. (statement of Representative Lofgren). 
301 Id. (statement of Representative Stewart). Representative Stewart further stated that “section 
702 is an extremely powerful tool that has proven effective in disrupting terror plots.” 
302 Id. (statement of Representative Frelinghuysen). 
303 Id. 
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Representative Robert Goodlatte believed that the amendment would 
prohibit the government from querying data already in its possession that had 
been legally collected under section 702.304  On June 16, 2016, the Massie 
Amendment was defeated in a 222 to 198 vote.305  One media outlet 
attributed the defeat of the amendment to the June 2016 Orlando attack.306 
 
C. Recent Scholarship Discussing the Regarding the Querying of Section 702 Information 
 
In a recently-published book, Professor Donohue raised concerns similar 
to those of Representatives Massie and Lofgren regarding the querying of 
information collected under Section 702.307  Professor Donohue wrote that, 
under the current procedures, “[American] citizens’ communications collected 
via Section 702 can now be mined using [American] citizens’ information as 
part of the queries.”308  She is troubled about the querying of incidentally 
collected Section 702 information,309 particularly in the context of criminal 
matters.310  Professor Donohue expressed concern that the “FBI stores 
unminimized Section 702 data together with information obtained from 
traditional FISA orders, allowing agents to search both caches of information 
simultaneously.”311  She points out that FBI queries of Section 702 
information may not be related to national security threats against our 
                                                
304 See 162 CONG. REC. H3895 (statement of Representative Goodlatte).  
305 See Final Vote Results For Roll Call 321, supra note 296. While this amendment recently was 
defeated in June 2016, the House passed the measure in 2015 (255–174 vote); in 2014, the 
same amendment was passed in “an even more lopsided 293–123” vote. Nelson, supra note 
296. Following the passage of the amendment in 2014 and 2015 by the House, the amendment 
was not considered by the Senate and “was axed in budget deals.” 
306 See Nelson, supra note 296 (“U.S. citizen Omar Mateen’s murder of 49 people at a Florida 
nightclub on Sunday appears to have doomed a legislative push to rein in warrantless 
surveillance with defeat of an amendment that twice passed by wide margins.”). 
307 See DONOHUE, supra note 20, at 72–74. 
308 Id. at 73. 
309 See id. 
310 See id. 
311 Id. at 73–74; Donohue, supra note 19, at 198; Kris, supra note 195, at 398. David Kris 
likewise noted that a “related question concerns the FBI’s ability to query un-minimized FAA § 
702 data for evidence of a crime, particularly a crime not related to foreign intelligence.”  
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country.312  Professor Donohue asserts that the querying of Section 702 
information, including incidentally-collected information for criminal 
purposes, leads to a problematic convergence between criminal law and 
national security law raising Fourth Amendment concerns.313  For example, 
Professor Donohue believes by allowing the FBI to query this data, 
information collected for foreign intelligence purposes can now be used for 
law enforcement purposes without the government demonstrating probable 
cause of criminal activity and in the absence of a warrant.314 
The FISA Court of Review considered the dichotomy between criminal 
and intelligence investigations in 2002 in In re Sealed.315  In this case, the FISA 
                                                
312 See DONOHUE, supra note 20. 
313 Id. at 74. As explained by Mr. Kris, United States persons’ communications could be 
collected incidentally under Section 702 in several ways. Kris, supra note 195 at 396. For 
example, a United States person could communicate with an individual who is the target of the 
surveillance under Section 702. In this situation, the communication of the United States 
person is incidentally-collected information. Incidental collection may also be acquired when 
“two non-U.S. persons discuss a U.S. person.” PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 
6. With respect to upstream collection, a U.S. person’s communication could be obtained as 
part of an “about” collection concerning an individual who is targeted. Kris, supra note 195, at 
396.   
314 See DONOHUE, supra note 20. Professor Donohue also raises the issue that certain FISC 
orders, including those issued under Section 702, are similar, and may be considered, general 
warrants which are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See id; see, e.g., Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981) (stating that the “Fourth Amendment was intended 
partly to protect against the abuses of the general warrants that had occurred in England and of 
the writs of assistance used in the Colonies"); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) 
(holding that the “Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the 
issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.’”). Whether FISC authorization under Section 702 constitutes a 
general warrant is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly however, and as discussed in Part II 
of this article, federal appellate courts, as well as the FISA Court of Review, consistently hold 
that, under Article II, the President has the inherent authority to conduct warrantless 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. See, e.g., Truong Dinh Hung, supra note 91, at 914–
15; Butenko, supra note 179, at 596, 605; In re Sealed Case, supra note 90, at 742; In re Directives, 
supra note 82, at 1012. These appellate courts recognize a foreign intelligence exception to the 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, as held in United States v. Mohamud, 
surveillance conducted under Section 702 surveillance "does not trigger the Warrant Clause" 
and falls within the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.  Mohamud, No. 
3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *15. As recognized in these decisions, a warrant is not 
required to acquire foreign intelligence information under Section 702. The Warrant Clause is 
not implicated in authorizing Section 702 surveillance.  
315 See In re Sealed Case, supra note 90. Prior to events of September 11, 2001, policies had been 
implemented to stovepipe information collected under intelligence authorities from criminal 
investigations. As found by the 9/11 Commission, these policies had a detrimental impact on 
the Intelligence Community’s abilities to disrupt terrorist activities. THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
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Court of Review evaluated whether a barrier—known as “the wall”—between 
intelligence investigations and law enforcement investigations was mandated 
by statute or the Constitution.316  After reviewing the arguments set forth by 
the government as well as amici, the FISA Court of Review concluded that 
the wall between intelligence and law enforcement investigations was not 
mandated by FISA or the Constitution.317  Notably, the Court believed that 
FISA did not “preclude or limit the government's use or proposed use of 
foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of 
criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.”318  
With respect to the concern of querying Section 702 for purely criminal 
investigative purposes, it is noteworthy that layers of statutory and procedural 
safeguards are built into the Section 702 querying provisions to protect 
constitutional privacy interests.319  Courts have considered the impact of 
querying this data on privacy interests and have concluded that the querying 
procedures present no Fourth Amendment impediments.320  As discussed 
above, the FISC considered whether procedures for querying information 
collected under section 702, including for criminal purposes, were consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.321  The FISC observed that FISA-mandated 
and FISC-approved minimization procedures place substantial constraints 
upon the government’s ability to acquire, retain, query, and disseminate 
                                                
REPORT, 78-80, 271 (July 2004), https://9-11commission.gov/report. In sharing frustration 
about the barrier between criminal and intelligence investigations, in August 2001, shortly 
before the attacks, an FBI agent presciently wrote: "Whatever has happened to this--someday 
someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more 
effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems.'" Id. at 271. 
316 See In re Sealed Case, supra note 90, at 721.  
317 Id. at 719–20. 
318 Id. at 727. 
319 See, e.g., 50 § 1881(a)(b)(1)-(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(g)(2); FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, 
supra note 17; CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra 17; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, 
supra note 17.  
320 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 6; Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at 
*26; Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *12 n. 20. 
321 Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 6 (citing NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 
7; FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 11–12; CIA MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 3-4) (This opinion was publicly released by the DNI on April 
19, 2016). 
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information obtained under Section 702.322  Moreover, the FISC recognized 
that the purpose of allowing queries that were designed to obtain information 
about possible crimes is not completely disassociated with foreign intelligence 
information.323  The FISC comprehensively reviewed the Fourth Amendment 
implications and concluded that the minimization procedures, including the 
querying provisions, strike a reasonable balance between the privacy interests 
of United States persons and the national security interests of our country, 
and thus, comply with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.324  Likewise, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon and the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York believed the querying provisions to be 
acceptable.325  
A principal concern with querying Section 702 data is that incidentally-
obtained information concerning United States persons may be included in 
the information that is queried.  In enacting Section 702, Congress recognized 
that United States person information could be incidentally collected under 
Section 702 and mandated minimization procedures to safeguard such privacy 
interests.326  For example, Senator Feinstein noted: “There is always the 
possibility of someone outside the country talking to a U.S. person inside the 
                                                
322 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 30–45. 
323 See id. at 42. 
324 See id. at 44–45. PCLOB Board Chairman David Medine and Board Member Patricia Wald 
“recommended requiring judicial approval for the use of U.S. person queries of Section 702 
data for foreign intelligence purposes.” PCLOB, Feb. 5, 2016, at 17 n. 4. In contrast, Mr. Kris 
noted that "recent authority" holds that querying information collected pursuant to Section 702 
is "best seen as part of the overall Fourth Amendment event described by the FAA, which 
includes but is not limited to acquisition, retention, querying, and dissemination of 
information,” rather than as a "separate, stand-alone Fourth Amendment event, such that it 
must satisfy constitutional requirements on its own." Kris, supra note 195, at 398–99 (citing 
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *26 (“[S]ubsequent querying of a § 702 
collection, even if U.S. person identifiers are used, is not a separate search and does not make § 
702 surveillance unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)).  
325 See Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *26; see also Hasbajrami, supra note 
139, at *12 n. 20. 
326 See PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 82–83 (explaining that the incidental 
communications “between a U.S. person and a non-U.S. person located outside the United 
States, as well as communications of non-U.S. persons outside the United States that may 
contain information about U.S. persons, was clearly contemplated by Congress at the time of 
drafting").  
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country. The bill addresses this with a process known as minimization.”327  
Courts that have considered the constitutionality of incidental collection 
have determined that such collections comply with the Fourth Amendment.  
In In re Directives, the FISC concluded that “[i]t is settled beyond peradventure 
that incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible 
acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful.”328  Likewise, in United 
States v. Hasbajrami, the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York held that when surveillance is lawfully conducted, including 
domestic surveillance of United States persons pursuant to a warrant or the 
surveillance of non-United States persons outside of the United States under 
Section 702, it follows that the incidental collection of non-targeted United 
States persons’ communications with the targeted persons is also lawfully 
acquired.329  
Recently, in United States v. Mohamud, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether the acquisition of incidentally-collected United States person 
information under Section 702 is constitutional.  In this case, Mohamed 
Mohamud was convicted of attempting to detonate a large bomb during an 
annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in a crowded area in downtown 
Portland, Oregon.  Following a conviction, Mohamud appealed, arguing in 
part that the incidental collection of his email communications with a foreign 
                                                
327 See 154 CONG. REC. S6119 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
328 In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1015; see Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, 
at *15 (“The § 702 acquisition targeting a non-U.S. person overseas is constitutionally 
permissible, so, under the general rule, the incidental collection of defendant’s [a U.S. 
citizen's] communications with the extraterritorial target would be lawful.”); see Mohamud, No. 
14-30217, supra note 155 at *17 (“The mere fact that more communications are being collected 
incidentally does not make it unconstitutional to apply the same approach to § 702 collection, 
though it does increase the importance of minimization procedures once the communications 
are collected.”); see also Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *7, 8 (“The search of communications 
between a U.S. person and individuals who are legitimate targets of Section 702 surveillance is 
constitutional.” “The collection of U.S. persons' communications—incidentally obtained 
through lawful targeting—does not require a separate warrant.”). 
329 See Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *9 (citing Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 
155, at *15). 
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national under Section 702 violated the Fourth Amendment.330  The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed with Mohamud’s position.  While the Ninth Circuit 
expressed concern about the large number of incidental communications 
collected through the use of Section 702,331 the court concluded that the 
acquisition of incidental collection was constitutional.332  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that when the underlying surveillance conducted is lawful, 
including surveillance conducted under Section 702, then the incidentally-
collected communication of a non-targeted United States person is lawful as 
well.333  
Incidental communications of individuals in the United States has proven 
                                                
330 See Mohamud, No. 14-30217, supra note 155 at *15. The Ninth Circuit noted that through the 
monitoring of a foreign national’s email account, the government learned that Mohamud was 
in contact with a foreign national outside of the United States. The communications collected 
from this contact, which included a limited number of emails between Mohamud and the 
foreign national, were used to obtain a FISA warrant to conduct surveillance of Mohamud. 
However, the collected emails between Mohamud and the foreign national were not introduced 
at trial.  
331 See id. at *17 (quoting PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 114 (noting that the “term 
‘incidental’ is appropriate because such collection is not accidental or inadvertent, but rather is 
an anticipated collateral result of monitoring an overseas target. But the term should not be 
understood to suggest that such collection is infrequent or that it is an inconsequential part of 
the Section 702 program”)). Mohamud asserted that large volume of incidental collection 
distinguishes it from prior cases. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the “most troubling aspect” 
of incidental collection under Section 702 is its “vast” volume, but nevertheless concluded that 
“the mere fact that more communications are being collected incidentally does not make it 
unconstitutional to apply the same approach to § 702 collection, though it does increase the 
importance of minimization procedures once the communications are collected.”  
332 See id. Both the United States District Court for the District of Oregon and the Ninth 
Circuit held that, under the third-party doctrine, Mohamud had a "reduced expectation of 
privacy in his communications to third parties." Id. at 45. The Ninth Circuit noted that when 
communications are sent to a third party, an individual's privacy interest in those 
communications are somewhat diminished. See id. at 46 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *11 & n.18). Referring to these same cases, 
the Ninth Circuit believed that an individual's privacy interests are diminished even more if the 
third party had provided the communications to the government voluntarily. 
333 See id. at 40-42 (citing In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1015  (holding that “incidental 
collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those 
acquisitions unlawful”); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 436 n. 24 (1977) (holding that 
a Title III wiretap warrant is not made unconstitutional by “failure to identify every individual 
who could be expected to be overheard,” but “the complete absence of prior judicial 
authorization would make an intercept unlawful”); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 
264, 280 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (explaining that “in the Title III context, incidental interception of a 
person’s conversations during an otherwise lawful surveillance” does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *9)). 
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to be essential to the disruption of terrorist plots in our country.  For 
example, incidental Section 702 information was crucial to the detection and 
disruption of a plan to attack the New York City subway system in 2009.334  
In connection to the subway plot, the FBI arrested Najibullah Zazi, a United 
States citizen in the United States, for his role in an al-Qaeda plot to carry out 
suicide attacks on the New York City subway system.335  Zazi was arrested 
before he and his accomplices could carry out this potentially catastrophic 
attack.336  As noted by the PCLOB, “[w]ithout the initial tip-off about Zazi 
and his plans, which came about by monitoring an overseas foreigner under 
Section 702 [i.e., incidental collection], the subway-bombing plot might have 
succeeded.”337  
Incidental collection obtained through the use of Section 702 was also 
used to uncover an al-Qaeda cell in Kansas City, Missouri that was in the 
preliminary stages of planning an attack on the New York Stock Exchange in 
2008.338  The United States Intelligence Community learned about the plot 
because the NSA was conducting surveillance under Section 702 targeting an 
email address used by an extremist in Yemen.339  Through the 702 
surveillance, the NSA discovered a connection between the extremist based in 
Yemen and an unknown individual in Kansas City, Missouri.340  The NSA 
gave the information to the FBI which then identified the unknown person as 
Khalid Ouazzani, a naturalized United States citizen.341  The NSA 
                                                
334 See THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, OVERSIGHT AND 
PARTNERSHIPS (August 
2013), https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_s
tory.pdf; see also A. G. Sulzberger and William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb 
New York Subway, NY TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010) (stating that in February 2010, Zazi pleaded guilty 
to “one of the most serious threats to the United States” since the attacks of September 11, 
2001).  
335 See THE FBI: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 39. 
336 See id. 
337 PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 109. 
338 See Katersky, Meek, Margolin, and Ross, supra note 11 (quoting FBI Assistant Director Sean 
Joyce’s testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence). 
339 See PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 108. 
340 See id. 
341 See id. 
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subsequently discovered that Ouazzani was connected to Al Qaeda associates 
based in the United States who had previously been part of an abandoned 
plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.  These individuals later pled 
guilty to providing and attempting to provide material support to Al Qaeda.342 
With respect to querying databases containing Section 702 data for 
information unrelated to national security matters, including incidentally-
collected information, the FISC and two federal district courts considered this 
issue and concluded that privacy interests were protected.343  FISA-mandated 
and FISC-approved minimization procedures provide safeguards to protect 
United States person information collected under the Section 702, including 
incidental collection.  Further, as noted by Robert Litt, procedural checks are 
placed upon the government’s use of Section 702 data in criminal 
proceedings.344  Mr. Litt explained that, similar to all information collected 
under FISA, Section 702-acquired information may only be used in a criminal 
proceeding with the approval of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 
General, or Assistant Attorney General for National Security.345  Moreover, 
procedures have been developed to ensure that information obtained under 
Section 702 will only be used in a criminal proceeding for: (1) matters related 
to national security including terrorism, proliferation, espionage, or 
cybersecurity;346 or (2) serious criminal matters involving “(i) death; (ii) 
                                                
342 See id.; see also Gia Vang, Kansas City man suspected in New York terror plot, FOX4KC.COM (June 
18, 2013, updated at 09:18 PM), http://fox4kc.com/2013/06/18/kansas-city-man-suspected-
in-new-york-terror-plot/. 
343 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 24–45; PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 11, at 59–60 
(recognizing that “FBI queries designed to elicit evidence of crimes unrelated to foreign 
intelligence rarely, if ever, produce responsive results from Section 702-acquired data”).  
344 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6; 50 
U.S.C. § 1806(b). 
345 Id. 
346 Kris, supra note 195, at 398 n. 75 (quoting Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, ODNI, Prepared 
Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the Brookings Institute (Feb. 4, 2015)); see FISA 
Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6 (“The 
Administration announced an additional restriction that prohibited the use in a criminal 
proceeding of any communication to or from, or information about, a U.S. person acquired 
under Section 702 except for crimes involving national security or several other serious 
crimes.”). 
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kidnapping; (iii) substantial bodily harm; (iv) conduct that constitutes a 
criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor as defined in 42 
USC 16911; (v) incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure as 
defined in 42 USC 5195c(e); (vi) cybersecurity; (vii) transnational crimes; or 
(vii) human trafficking.”347  
In addition to the limitations of when Section 702 information may be 
used in criminal proceedings, under FISA, the government must provide 
notice to an aggrieved person when the government intends to use Section 
702 information in any proceeding, hearing, or trial.348  The aggrieved person 
may then choose to seek to suppress the evidence on the grounds that (1) the 
information was unlawfully acquired; or (2) the surveillance was beyond the 
scope of what had been authorized by the court.349  
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend against placing further 
constraints upon the government’s ability to query its own databases that may 
include Section 702 information.  Such querying capabilities permit the 
executive branch “to quickly and effectively locate foreign intelligence 
information, such as information potentially related to a terrorist plot against 
the United States, without having to sift through each individual 
communication that has been collected.”350 Statutory and procedural 
safeguards protect United States privacy interests with respect to querying 
information collected under Section 702.  Further, the executive branch has a 
record of complying with these safeguards.351  Recent court decisions 
consistently have found that the querying provisions present no constitutional 
                                                
347 Kris, supra note 195, at 398 n. 75 (quoting Litt, Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence 
Reform at the Brookings Institute, supra note 346). 
348 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (stating that an “aggrieved 
person” is “a person who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose 
communications or activities were subject to electronic surveillance”).  
349 50 U.S.C. § 1881(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e). 
350 FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6. 
351 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17 (March 2014 at 
8–11; Oct. 2014 at 8–10; June 2015 at 8–11; Sept. 2015 at 8-12; Feb. 2016 at 8–13; Nov. 2016 
at 8-12) (noting that as part of its reviews, DOJ and ODNI review the querying of 
unminimized Section 702-acquired communications using United States person identifiers). 
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infirmities: the FISC concluded that querying procedures comply with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment;352 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon recognized that querying of collected information is not a 
separate search and does not make surveillance conducted under Section 702 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment;353 and the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York held that it would be inconsistent to 
permit the government to review information in its possession, but prohibit 
queries of the same information.354  As recognized by the FISC,  following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, the government was heavily criticized for its 
failure to identify information that may have disrupted them.355  Statutory and 
procedural safeguards, including minimization procedures, exist with respect 
to the querying databases that contain lawfully collected Section 702.  These 
safeguards ensure that United States person privacy interests are protected.  
Placing further constraints upon the government’s ability to query its own 
databases would inhibit the government’s effectiveness in identifying 
information critical to our national security interests.  
 
V. APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO A HYPOTHETICAL 
 
To demonstrate how the matters discussed in this article balance our 
fundamental privacy interests with national security interests, the below 
hypothetical is used.  The imagined facts of the hypothetical are as follows. 
 
Anne, a nineteen-year old United States citizen from Denver, 
Colorado, is a recent high school graduate.  Upon graduating from 
high school, Anne had trouble finding a job, but eventually secured a 
                                                
352 Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 44–45; see Kris, Trends And Predictions In Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance: The FAA And Beyond, supra note 195, at 399 (citing Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-
KI-1, supra note 155, at *26 (“[S]ubsequent querying of a § 702 collection, even if U.S. person 
identifiers are used, is not a separate search and does not make § 702 surveillance unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”).  
353 See Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, supra note 155, at *26. 
354 Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *12 n. 20.  
355 See Case Redacted, supra note 134, at 42. 
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minimum-wage position at ShoeWorld.  She could not afford her 
own apartment, so she lived at home with her parents and three 
younger brothers.  
 
At ShoeWorld, Anne became friendly with two of her coworkers, 
Belinda, also aged nineteen, and Carl, twenty-four years old, both 
United States citizens.  At work, the coworkers discussed the 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq and became increasingly angry and 
frustrated about the casualties in those conflicts overseas.356  
Other than her two coworkers, Anne does not have many friends.  
When she was home, she spent much of her time alone in her room 
perusing the Internet.  Several months ago, through the Internet, she 
came into contact with a young man, Dave, who immigrated to Syria 
from England and joined ISIS.  Dave described how he and other 
ISIS members were working together to build a utopian “Caliphate 
state.”357  Dave also told Anne that there was a group of young 
women, just like her, who were part of a “sisterhood” of women to 
help achieve their utopian goal.  After several months, Anne decided 
to travel to Syria to join Dave and the other members of ISIS.  
Without her parents’ knowledge, Anne traveled to Aleppo, Syria.  
There, she was met by Dave. 
  
After several weeks, Anne was tasked with trying to recruit other 
Western nationals to join ISIS.  Soon thereafter, the executive branch 
learned of her activities.  Under the modified Section 702 proposed 
in this article and Executive Order 12333, as soon as the executive 
branch learned of Anne’s conduct, it was able to initiate electronic 
surveillance of her communications.  Through this surveillance, the 
executive branch learned that Anne had convinced Belinda to join 
ISIS.  In their conversations, the two teenagers discussed Belinda’s 
travel arrangements.  Belinda also told Anne that she had stolen a 
suitcase from Target to prepare for her trip.  
 
With the knowledge of Belinda’s travel plans, learned through the 
Section 702 collection, the FBI arrested Belinda at Denver 
International Airport where she had intended to fly to Turkey, and 
then join Anne in Syria.  Upon her arrest, Belinda told the FBI that 
                                                
356 While the facts in this scenario are fictional, they are based, in part, upon Erin Marie 
Saltman & Melanie Smith, ‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, INSTITUTE 
FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 4, 12 (2015), 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phen
omenon.pdf; Guillame N. Beaurpere, ISIS and Protracted War: Why Violent Extremists Persist in the 
Face of Defeat, 6 COUNTER TERRORIST TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 4, 4-5 (2014), 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-September14.pdf. 
357 See, e.g., Saltman and Smith, supra note 356, at 13–14.  
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she believed in the ISIS cause and intended to take up arms and join 
in their fight.358  She professed her belief in the legitimacy of violent 
jihad and declared her hopes to someday join the battlefield on 
behalf of a jihadist group.  Belinda was charged with conspiring to 
provide material support to ISIS.359  
 
Anne also communicated with Carl.  Through Anne and Carl’s 
communications, the government learned that Carl, with Anne’s 
encouragement, decided to help the ISIS cause by setting off 
explosives in a crowded area in Denver.  The government queried its 
databases, using Carl’s telephone number as an identifier, and learned 
that Carl had a previous conviction for unlawful possession of 
firearms.  Pursuant to a warrant, the FBI searched Carl’s home and 
found explosive materials and illegal firearms.  Carl was arrested and 
his plot was thwarted.  Carl was charged with conspiring to provide 
material support to ISIS and conspiring to use weapons of mass 
destruction.360 
 
Before their respective trials, as required by FISA, the government 
informed Belinda and Carl that it intended to use foreign intelligence 
information collected under Section 702.  Based upon information 
collected under Section 702, both Belinda and Carl were convicted of 
the crimes for which they were charged.  Belinda was sentenced to 
five years and Carl was sentenced to 43 years in prison.  
 
As illustrated by this fictional scenario, through the use of Section 702 as 
proposed in this article, almost immediately upon learning of Anne’s 
activities, the government obtained the authority to conduct electronic 
surveillance of Anne’s telephone number.  To receive such authority, the 
executive branch was required to satisfy both (the proposed) Section 702 and 
Executive Order 12333.  For example, pursuant to Executive Order 12333, 
                                                
358 See Jenny Deam, Colorado Woman Who Tried to Join Islamic State Sentenced to 4 Years, LA TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-shannon-conley-sentencing-20150123-
story.html (describing that an ISIS "recruiter . . . encouraged Douglas McAuthur McCain, 33, 
to leave Minnesota and go to Syria to take up arms with Islamic State"). 
359 See, e.g., id. (detailing that Shannon Maureen Conley, a 19-year old Colorado woman who 
tried to join the Islamic State terrorist group and was sentenced to 48 months in prison. Conley 
"pleaded guilty in September to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a 
foreign terrorist organization"). 
360 See, e.g., Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States 
and United Kingdom, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (July 7, 2010),  
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/charges-unsealed-against-five-alleged-members-al-qaeda-
plot-attack-united-states-and-united.   
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the Attorney General was required to determine that there was probable 
cause to believe that Anne was acting as a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power before conducting surveillance.361  Under the proposed 
framework, the FISC would review the AG’s probable cause findings with 
respect to Anne.  Further, at all stages, including the collection, retention, 
querying, use, and dissemination of Anne’s communications, minimization 
procedures would play an integral role in protecting her privacy interests.362  
Belinda and Carl’s communications are incidentally collected information.  
Unlike Anne, they were not the targets of the Section 702 surveillance.  
However, because they were communicating with Anne, their 
communications were collected as part of the surveillance.  Like Anne, as U.S 
persons, Belinda and Carl’s communications are protected under 
minimization procedures, including the collection, retention, querying, use, 
and dissemination of their communications.  As illustrated by this 
hypothetical scenario, collecting and querying incidentally collected 
information is critical to our national security interests.  If someone in the 
United States is communicating with a terrorist overseas, it is essential that 
the government is able to obtain this information to expose possible terrorist 
threats within our country.  Through these incidentally collected 
communications, the government learned that Belinda planned to join ISIS in 
Syria, and that Carl, a homegrown terrorist, planned to set off explosives in 
Denver.  
With respect to the criminal prosecution of Belinda and Carl, the 
information collected about them could only be used with the approval of the 
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General 
for National Security.363  Further, such information could only be used if it 
                                                
361 See Executive Order 12333, supra note 106, § 2.5. 
362 See NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 7; see also FBI MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 11–12; see also CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 
3–4. 
363 See FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6. 
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related to national security or involved a serious crime.364  As such, while the 
information collected likely could be used as evidence of conspiring to 
provide material support to ISIS and conspiring to use weapons of mass 
destruction, the government likely would be prohibited from using the 
information as evidence of Belinda’s theft of a suitcase.  As a further 
safeguard, the government would be required to provide Belinda and Carl 
with notice that they intended to enter their communications collected under 
Section 702 at trial.365  Belinda and Carl would have the option of seeking to 
suppress the evidence upon the grounds that (1) the information was not 
obtained lawfully; or (2) the surveillance was beyond the scope of what the 
court authorized or approved.366  
Anne, Belinda, and Carl are protected under the Fourth Amendment.  
The government’s surveillance of their communications must be 
reasonable.367  Strong national security interests are at stake, e.g., what United 
States persons are joining the terrorist group ISIS, efforts they were taking to 
undermine the security of the United States, intent to use explosives in a 
crowded area, and ability to quickly obtain information related to these 
matters.  Equally significant, robust oversight requirements and procedural 
safeguards ensure the protection of United States person privacy interests. 
Their privacy interests are protected at all stages of the process, from 
collecting foreign intelligence information, querying the information, and then 
using the information to pursue criminal convictions.368  Under the 
                                                
364 See Kris, Trends And Predictions In Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA And Beyond, supra 
note 195, at 398 n. 75 (quoting Litt, Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the 
Brookings Institute, supra note 345); see also FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 6.  In 2015, “the Administration announced an additional restriction 
that prohibited the use in a criminal proceeding of any communication to or from, or 
information about, a U.S. person acquired under Section 702 except for crimes involving 
national security or several other serious crimes.”  
365 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). 
366 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e). 
367 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012. 
368 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(c)(1), a(d)(1), (e); see also 50 U.S.C. § 
1806(c), (e); see also FISA Amendments Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 
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hypothetical, applying the totality of the circumstances test, the executive 
branch’s collection of Anne’s electronic communications, and the incidental 
collection of her friends’ communications, are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.369  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The proposed recommendations set forth in this article would strengthen 
Section 702 by authorizing the executive branch to acquire foreign 
intelligence information of both United States and non-United States persons 
outside of the United States without individualized judicial review, with added 
safeguards for United States persons.  Restoring these essential surveillance 
authorities to the executive branch would serve to counter the evolving threat 
of Americans leaving our country to join terrorist organizations abroad.  
Importantly, comprehensive safeguards and oversight provisions are built into 
the proposed modifications that would protect United States person privacy 
interests.  
The misuse of intelligence authorities of the 1960s and 1970s as 
documented by the Church and Pike Committees has been addressed.  The 
executive branch has an established history of compliance with the statutory 
                                                
3, at 6; Kris, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y, supra note 195, at 21 n. 75 (quoting Litt, Prepared 
Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the Brookings Institute, supra note 346)). 
369 See In re Directives, supra note 82, at 1012 (citing Samson, supra note 89, at 848; Garner, supra 
note 89, at 8–9); see also Mohamud, No. 14-30217, supra note 155 at *18–20. United States v. 
Mohamud is analogous to the hypothetical presented here. As discussed above, Mohamud, a 
United States person in the United States, was convicted of attempting to detonate a large 
bomb during an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in a crowded area in downtown 
Portland, Oregon. Through the monitoring of a foreign national’s email account under Section 
702, the government learned that Mohamud was in contact with a foreign national outside of 
the United States. The government used this incidentally-collected information to obtain a 
FISA warrant to conduct surveillance of Mohamud. Mohamud challenged the constitutionality 
of the collection. The Ninth Circuit applied a totality of the circumstance test to determine 
whether the protections set forth in Section 702 were reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. While the Ninth Circuit did not give much weight to the oversight procedures, 
the court concluded that the targeting and minimization procedures adequately protected 
Mohamud’s privacy interest. After evaluating the safeguards mandated in Section 702, and in 
light of the government’s national security interests, the Ninth Circuit concluded that as 
applied to Mohamud, Section 702 was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
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requirements of Section 702.370  Reports by the PCLOB, Attorney General, 
and Director of National Intelligence consistently show that the executive 
branch is fulfilling its statutory and procedural obligations.  Moreover, in 
reauthorizing the FAA, including Section 702, the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence found that the statutory provisions have been implemented in 
a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons 
and is subject to extensive oversight by all three branches of our 
government.371 
The proposed changes to the FAA, particularly Section 702, are well-
grounded in constitutional law, provide essential safeguards to privacy 
concerns, and strengthen the executive branch’s surveillance authorities to 
counter those engaged in terrorist activities.  Historically, it had been within 
the discretion of the executive branch to acquire foreign intelligence 
information of persons outside of the United States without seeking judicial 
review.  The FAA limits this executive branch authority, beyond what was 
constitutionally required.  The FAA is scheduled to sunset in December 2017.  
It is recommended that Congress adopt the proposed changes to the FAA, 
including Section 702, outlined in this article, and restore these authorities to 
the executive branch.  
Moreover, it is recommended that no further limitations be placed upon 
the government’s ability to query the information already in its possession.  
Multiple layers of protections currently exist for the querying of Section 702 
data and the executive branch has a record of complying with these 
procedural safeguards.372  As stated in United States v. Hasbajrami, “in this era 
there are individuals and groups dedicated to inflicting grave harm on our 
nation,” and the government’s intelligence tools “are a critical component of 
                                                
370 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17.  
371 S. Rept. 112-174, FAA SUNSETS EXTENSION ACT OF 2012, at 1, 3–4 (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/senate-report/174/1.  
372 See Release of a Summary of DOJ and ODNI Oversight of Section 702, supra note 17 . 
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our government’s efforts to protect us from harm.”373  Our government “has 
a duty to respect and protect our constitutional rights while simultaneously 
ensuring the nation’s security.”374  The proposed recommendations set forth 
in this article would strengthen our surveillance authorities while protecting 
individuals rights to help achieve this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
373 Hasbajrami, supra note 139, at *1. 
374 Id. 
